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NONMARKET VALUES IN FAMILY BUSINESSES
BENJAMIN MEANS*
ABSTRACT
Despite the economic importance of family businesses, legal schol-
arship has often overlooked their distinctive character. Instead,
scholars focus on the chosen form of business organization—
partnership, corporation, LLC—and assume that the participants are
economically rational actors who seek to maximize their individual
preferences. This Article contends that family businesses are exten-
sions of family relationships and that nonmarket values affect their
goals and governance choices. 
Just as family law scholars have shown that contract principles
can be applied to regulate intimate relationships, corporate law
scholars should recognize that the intimacy of family life often sub-
stitutes for arm’s length bargaining in family businesses. Notably,
although relationships of trust and loyalty can lower transaction
costs, the strength of family ties offers an intrinsic benefit for family
business participants apart from any economic return they may
achieve. 
When disputes arise in family businesses, courts have an indis-
pensable role to play because the parties cannot anticipate and
resolve all potential conflicts in advance. Like other business ven-
tures, family businesses are long-term relational contracts. However,
rather than seeking to supply the terms that would have been chosen
by individuals who are disconnected from one another and economi-
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cally rational in their pursuit of their own advantage, the law should
recognize the importance of shared family values relevant to the
parties’ expectations. Put differently, to respect private ordering, the
law must respond to the ways that individuals actually choose to
order their affairs.
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INTRODUCTION
Countless New Yorker cartoons trade on the incongruity of family
life and the workplace. A husband looks across the kitchen table and
says to his wife and four children, “I’ve called the family together to
announce that, because of inflation, I’m going to have to let two of
you go.”1 A corporate executive asks an older employee, “How long
have you been with our firm, Dad?”2 At a board meeting, a man and
woman announce to a stunned group of executives, “We’re not your
real parent corporation.”3
In each cartoon, the humor depends on our awareness of a
distinction between family relationships and business relation-
ships.4 Most families aspire to distribute roughly equal resources to
their children,5 to offer special protection to their most vulnerable
members,6 and to preserve their identity over time.7 Although fam-
ilies engage in economic production, consumption, and exchange,8
1. Joseph Farris, Cartoon, NEW YORKER, Dec. 2, 1974, at 42.
2. Gahan Wilson, Cartoon, NEW YORKER, Oct. 25, 2010, at 73.
3. Leo Cullum, Cartoon, NEW YORKER, July 5, 2004, at 78.
4. See Ivan Lansberg S., Managing Human Resources in Family Firms: The Problem of
Institutional Overlap, ORGANIZATIONAL DYNAMICS, Summer 1983, at 39, 40 (describing
families and businesses as “two qualitatively different social institutions”). However, the
sharp segregation of working life and family life is culturally specific and relatively recent.
See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1497, 1499 (1983) (“In the early nineteenth century, as men’s work was largely
removed to the factory while women’s work remained primarily in the home, there came to
be a sharp dichotomy between ‘the home’ and ‘the [workaday] world.’” (alteration in original)
(footnotes omitted)).
5. See Lansberg, supra note 4, at 42 (“In horizontal family relationships, such as the
relationships among siblings, equality is the dominant fairness norm.”). 
6. See id. at 40 (“[S]ocial relations in the family are structured to satisfy family members’
various developmental needs.”). Thus, “[t]he exchange of resources in the family is guided by
implicit affective principles that focus ... on the needs and long-term well-being of the other,
rather than on the specific value of the goods and services.” Id. at 42. The assumption that
families respond to vulnerability may explain why legal theorists often focus on formal
conceptions of equality that fail to account for “human dependency and vulnerability.” Martha
Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 263
(2010) (“The family is the mechanism by which we privatize, and thus hide dependency and
its implications.”).
7. See Teresa J. Rothausen, Management Work—Family Research and Work—Family
Fit: Implications for Building Family Capital in Family Business, 22 FAM. BUS. REV. 220, 226
(2009) (stating that “shared vision” is part of what constitutes a family).
8. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, THE PURCHASE OF INTIMACY 1-2 (2005).
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family relationships are considered valuable for their own sake and
not principally for their economic or other instrumental advan-
tages.9 By contrast, a traditional business relies on contracts
negotiated at arm’s length, aims to make a profit, and must identify
and reward merit.10 In a competitive market environment, busi-
nesses adapt to take advantage of new opportunities.11 For inves-
tors, the business serves as a means to an end.12
In a family business,13 however, the values associated with family
life must coexist with the values of the marketplace.14 For instance,
when the junior employees in a business venture are also the
children of the founders, family concerns become work concerns and
vice versa.15 Individuals cannot negotiate the distinct expectations
associated with each environment simply by adopting one social
identity when in the workplace with colleagues and another when
at home with family.16 Thus, a successful family business must find
ways to mediate the tension between expectations rooted in family
life and expectations inherent to the marketplace.17
9. See ELIZABETH ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 157 (1993).
10. Lansberg, supra note 4, at 42 (“[T]he norm of fairness that operates in the firm is
based on the concept of merit.”).
11. See, e.g., Darian M. Ibrahim & D. Gordon Smith, Entrepreneurs on Horseback:
Reflections on the Organization of Law, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 71, 84 (2008) (defining entre-
preneurship in terms of “new products or services, new ways of organizing, or new geographic
markets”); Avishalom Tor, The Fable of Entry: Bounded Rationality, Market Discipline, and
Legal Policy, 101 MICH. L. REV. 482, 489 (2002) (“[C]urrent theories of entry assume that
entrants are rational decisionmakers who will attempt entry only if it is profit maximizing.”
(emphasis omitted)).
12. See Daniel J.H. Greenwood, Fictional Shareholders: For Whom Are Corporate
Managers Trustees, Revisited, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 1021, 1023 (1996) (“[W]hatever else
shareholders may or may not want, every shareholder wants to make a profit and that is all
that is really important for the operation of corporate law and, indeed, the corporation
itself.”).
13. For an analysis of the boundaries of the family business, see infra Part II.A.
14. See, e.g., MANFRED F.R. KETS DE VRIES & RANDEL S. CARLOCK WITH ELIZABETH
FLORENT-TREACY, FAMILY BUSINESS ON THE COUCH: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE 9 (2007)
(“[I]n a business family, normal family goals may come into conflict with the business’s
economic goals because an important theme within the family system is to meet the human
and psychological needs of its members rather than to arrive at the best economic return.”).
15. See, e.g., Orchard v. Covelli, 590 F. Supp. 1548 (W.D. Pa. 1984); Keating v. Keating,
No. 00749, 2003 WL 23213143 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 3, 2003).
16. KELIN E. GERSICK ET AL., GENERATION TO GENERATION: LIFE CYCLES OF THE FAMILY
BUSINESS 5 (1997) (“Problems arise because the same individuals have to fulfill obligations
... as parents and as professional managers.”).
17. See id.; TORSTEN M. PIEPER, MECHANISMS TO ASSURE LONG-TERM FAMILY BUSINESS
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As long as these expectations align, the business and family both
stand to benefit.18 The strength and durability of family relation-
ships can be harnessed to solve business problems.19 For instance,
family members might create or modify business roles without
formal contracts and managers generally have the flexibility to pur-
sue long-term opportunities at the expense of short-term profits.20
In a pinch, family members will sometimes loan money to the busi-
ness or agree to work without compensation.21 Moreover, business
ownership can provide nonmonetary benefits to family members
such as stable employment, status in the community, and agreeable
SURVIVAL 7 (2007); Lansberg, supra note 4, at 39-40.
18. For a discussion of value creation in family firms, see Michael Carney, Corporate
Governance and Competitive Advantage in Family-Controlled Firms, 29 ENTREPRENEURSHIP
THEORY & PRAC. 249 (2005). Until recently, scholars had been “skeptical, suggesting that
factors such as altruism, nepotism, and weak risk-bearing attributes tend to harm the
longevity and efficiency of the family enterprise.” Id. at 249. However, some studies indicate
that higher levels of trust may permit more efficient management. See id. at 257-59.
19. In reciprocal social networks of trust and loyalty, the accumulated social capital
“reduces transaction costs: ‘There is no need to spend time and money making sure that
others will uphold their end of the arrangement or penalizing them if they don’t.’” Angela
Harris, Reforming Alone?, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1449, 1458 (2002) (quoting ROBERT D. PUTNAM,
BOWLING ALONE 288 (2000)) (reviewing DEBORAH L. RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE:
REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION (2002)).
20. See AMY SCHUMAN ET AL., FAMILY BUSINESS AS PARADOX 2 (2010) (“[F]amily businesses
... have a longer time horizon than most nonfamily firms, as they view the business as crucial
to perpetuating the family into future generations.”); see also Andrew Martin, In Company
Town, Cuts but No Layoffs, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2011, at BU10 (describing efforts by a family
business to retain employees despite lower product demand and quoting the company’s
president, a granddaughter of the founder: “You can’t cut your way to prosperity. You can’t
grow if you are cutting your lifeblood—and that’s the skills and experience your work force
delivers”).
21. See, e.g., Emily Chamlee-Wright & Virgil Henry Storr, Community Resilience in New
Orleans East: Deploying the Cultural Toolkit Within a Vietnamese American Community, in
COMMUNITY DISASTER RECOVERY AND RESILIENCY 101, 115-16 (DeMond Shondell Miller &
Jason David Rivera eds., 2011) (describing how a woman was able to restore her seafood
processing business after Hurricane Katrina by living with her daughter and obtaining a
“$300,000 loan from another of her daughters and son-in-law, which was enough to buy
cooling and freezing equipment to store the seafood”).
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working conditions.22 Indeed, some commentators celebrate family
business as a model for creative, humane capitalism.23
However, the strengths of a family business are also potential
weaknesses.24 Over time, “conflicts manifest themselves in the form
of normative contradictions whereby what is expected from individ-
uals in terms of family principles often violates what is expected
from them according to business principles.”25 For example, the
transfer of control from one generation to the next invites tension
between the family norm of equal treatment and the business norm
of meritocracy.26 In a crisis, the close emotional bonds that once sup-
ported a family business can become obstacles to rational action.27
22. If nonmonetary benefits can be valued in economic terms, a rational actor would
pursue a family business venture if the total aggregate expected value exceeded the closest
nonfamily substitute opportunity. Yet, as argued in Part II, family values and business values
are sometimes incommensurable. See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation
in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 (1994) (“Incommensurability occurs when the relevant
goods cannot be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our considered
judgments about how these goods are best characterized.” (emphasis omitted)).
23. See Steven H. Hobbs & Fay Wilson Hobbs, Family Businesses and the Business of
Families: A Consideration of the Role of the Lawyer, 4 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 153, 158 (1998)
(“Socially and culturally, the family business offers the opportunity to unify work and family
concerns for the benefit of succeeding generations.”); see also ANDREA COLLI, THE HISTORY OF
FAMILY BUSINESS 1850-2000, at 23 (2003) (describing without endorsing the view that the
family firm “held out the prospect of a new production model—one much more creative and
less impersonal, moulded by elements like friendship and kinship”).
24. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 26 (“The family system and business system,
by their very nature, are filled with potential conflicts.”).
25. Lansberg, supra note 4, at 40; see also SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 21.
26. KETS DE VRIES ET AL., supra note 14, at 25 (“Unresolved personal conflicts, lack of
trust, difficult interpersonal relationships, sibling rivalry, generational issues, the family’s
demands on the business—any or all of these issues can affect a family firm’s success.”).
27. See, e.g., Lansberg, supra note 4, at 41 (“Founders often find themselves in the difficult
situation of having to choose between either hiring (or firing) an incompetent relative or
breaking up their relationship with some part of the family.”).
1192 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1185
Siblings sue siblings;28 children sue parents;29 spouses divorce;30
families and businesses fall apart.31
If family businesses in the United States were relatively rare or
economically unimportant, a lack of attention to their distinctive
features might be understandable. However, family businesses are
a vital part of the economy: they are the clear majority of all
businesses, employ about half the nation’s workforce, and contribute
a substantial amount to the nation’s gross domestic product.32 Small
businesses often begin as entrepreneurial family ventures, and
some of the nation’s largest corporations are family controlled.33
28. Meiselman v. Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d 551 (N.C. 1983) (finding possible shareholder
oppression where one brother, the majority shareholder, had excluded his brother from
participation in the business venture); Morrison v. Gugle, 755 N.E.2d 404 (Ohio Ct. App.
2001) (shareholder oppression dispute between twin sisters).
29. Keating v. Keating, No. 00749, 2003 WL 23213143, at *1 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 3,
2003) (noting that the dispute “pits father and daughter against son and vice versa in a
lengthy internecine struggle for control of the administration of the family-run closely held
food distribution business”).
30. Thrasher v. Thrasher, 103 Cal. Rptr. 618, 620-21 (Ct. App. 1972) (withholding of
dividends motivated by marital dispute).
31. Consider, for instance, the Haft family. See David J. Morrow, Denouement of a Family
Feud?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 1999, at BU2. The father, Herbert H. Haft, founded Dart Drugs,
a successful discount drugstore chain. Id. His children, Linda, Ronald, and Robert, joined the
business, and Robert soon founded Crown Books, a chain of discount bookstores. Id. The
combined business enterprises were highly profitable. Id. Yet, after a Wall Street Journal
article reported that Robert was to assume command, Herbert saw a threat to his leadership,
became “enraged,” and used his controlling stake to oust Robert and install Ronald. Id. Robert
sued for wrongful termination and eventually prevailed. Id. However, “[t]he rift didn’t end
with Robert’s lawsuit. His parents divorced, and Herbert and Ronald soon parted ways over
control of the company.” Id.
32. See Dwight Drake, Transitioning the Family Business, 83 WASH. L. REV. 123, 125-26
(2008). The numbers vary, of course, depending on how we define family business. See infra
Part II.A. Also, although the typical family business operates on a small scale, some of the
largest enterprises in the nation and the world are family dominated. See, e.g., Lansberg,
supra note 4, at 39 (noting that 35 percent of Fortune 500 companies are family owned or
controlled); Richard C. Schragger, The Anti-Chain Store Movement, Localist Ideology, and the
Remnants of the Progressive Constitution, 1920-1940, 90 IOWA L. REV. 1011, 1088-89 (2005)
(discussing size and growth of Wal-Mart).
33. See Eric A. Chiappinelli, Stories from Camp Automotive: Communicating the
Importance of Family Dynamics to Corporate Law Students, 34 GA. L. REV. 699, 700 (2000).
Internationally, family businesses are even more prevalent. See, e.g., Teemu Ruskola,
Conceptualizing Corporations and Kinship: Comparative Law and Development Theory in a
Chinese Perspective, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1599 (2000).
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Yet, the “study of family business is still relatively new.”34 As one
legal commentator has observed, “corporate law casebooks are
astonishingly devoid of any systematic consideration of family
dynamics.”35 More broadly, “the family owned and controlled firm is
either absent or treated as an exception ... [i]n prominent theories
of the firm.”36 The most straightforward explanation for the over-
sight is doctrinal: as a matter of business enterprise law, affective
ties among shareholders are irrelevant; a family business, after all,
may be closely held or publicly traded and may be organized as a
partnership, corporation, or limited liability company (LLC).37 Thus,
despite extensive ongoing research in other disciplines, the study of
family business for U.S. legal scholars has remained in large part
the specialized province of estate planners and tax lawyers.38 
The dearth of legal scholarship concerning family business
governance may also reflect deeper methodological limitations.
Corporate law scholars do not often pause to consider the influence
of social relationships on governance choices; instead they ask how
economically rational, autonomous investors would select appro-
priate default governance rules and bargain to protect their
individual interests.39 From this perspective, business entities are
34. GERSICK ET AL., supra note 16, at 4; see also Susan Clark Muntean, Analyzing the
Dearth in Family Enterprise Research, in THEORETICAL DEVELOPMENTS AND FUTURE
RESEARCH IN FAMILY BUSINESS 3, 4 (Phillip H. Phan & John E. Butler eds., 2008) (“Given the
dominance of family business enterprise, it is a puzzle that the study of family is rare in
theoretical and empirical studies of corporations.”).
35. Chiappinelli, supra note 33, at 710. Chiappinelli found this neglect “surprising, in that
many small businesses, and a few (though atypical) large ones, are owned and managed by
a single family.” Id. at 700.
36. Muntean, supra note 34, at 4.
37. See infra Part I. Indeed family status makes only a single appearance in the Model
Business Corporation Act as part of a broad definition of self-dealing transactions. See MODEL
BUS. CORP. ACT ANN. § 8.60(1) (2011). The Model Act’s definition of an interested party
includes “the director’s spouse[,] ... child, step child, grandchild, parent, step parent, grand-
parent, sibling, step sibling, half sibling, aunt, uncle, niece or nephew (or spouse of any
thereof) of the director or of the director’s spouse.” Id. § 8.60(5)(i)-(ii). The definition also
includes any “individual living in the same home as the director.” Id. § 8.60(5)(iii). 
38. See, e.g., Drake, supra note 32. For an argument that family businesses need more
holistic advice, see Hobbs & Hobbs, supra note 23, at 154 (“[F]amily business law [is] a unique
specialty with emerging practice parameters.”). For a recent article focusing on the “dual-role
fiduciary” in the family business context, in which a family trustee is also a business manager,
see Karen E. Boxx, Too Many Tiaras: Conflicting Fiduciary Duties in the Family-Owned
Business Context, 49 HOUS. L. REV. 233 (2012).
39. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
1194 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1185
fundamentally contractual.40 To the extent that family relationships
intrude upon the rational actor’s solipsistic domain, they are per-
ceived in economic terms as a trust mechanism that may substitute
for ex ante bargaining, lowering the transaction costs of invest-
ment.41
To be sure, family relationships can lower transaction costs, but
this is not the whole story; the rational-actor model of standard law
and economics lacks the conceptual resources necessary to fully
appreciate the nature of private ordering within a family business.
This Article contends that family businesses are an extension of
family relationships, in which the participants find intrinsic and not
merely instrumental value.42 Whether organized as partnerships,
corporations, or LLCs, family firms are economic institutions em-
bedded in a context of family social roles and values.43 In interpret-
CORPORATE LAW 232 (1991) (“Investors in any venture are concerned about the possibility that
the actions of others will reduce their return. Those who attempt to attract other people’s
money have incentives to adopt governance mechanisms that respond to potential investors’
concerns.”). Even when standard economic analysis examines social phenomena, it posits
individually rational, utility-maximizing explanations. See, e.g., GARY S. BECKER & KEVIN M.
MURPHY, SOCIAL ECONOMICS 5 (2000) (contending that “social forces” can be incorporated into
“rational choice analysis”).
40. See Michael D. Klausner, The Contractarian Theory of Corporate Law: A Generation
Later, 31 J. CORP. L. 779, 780 (2006) (“The corporate contract consists of the terms of a
corporation’s charter and the corporate law the firm selects by virtue of incorporating in a
particular state.”). Further, as Professor Klausner explains, the contractarian theory “implies
a theory of the role of corporate law: corporate law should merely provide a set of default
rules.” Id. Thus, contractarian scholars are those who “view corporate law as simply a modest
extension of contract law.” John C. Coffee, Jr., The Mandatory/Enabling Balance in Corporate
Law: An Essay on the Judicial Role, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1618, 1619 (1989).
41. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39 (“[I]f family-owned ventures reduce the
agency costs of management, there will be gains for all to share.”).
42. The family is, among other things, a system that connects individuals and structures
their experiences. See, e.g., DAVID BORK, FAMILY BUSINESS, RISKY BUSINESS 26 (1986) (“A
systems concept sees what is going on in the individual as inseparable from the family
network of relationships in which the individual is embedded, the emotional processes in that
system, and the way the system was balanced before symptoms appeared.”).
43. For a general discussion of how economic institutions are embedded in social context,
see NEIL FLIGSTEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF MARKETS: AN ECONOMIC SOCIOLOGY OF TWENTY-
FIRST-CENTURY CAPITALIST SOCIETIES (2001). Of course, families are themselves a way of
structuring the use of economic resources. See Jill Elaine Hasday, Intimacy and Economic
Exchange, 119 HARV. L. REV. 491, 493 (2005) (“Economic exchange is not foreign to intimate
relations, either as a matter of first principles or as a positive matter of legal regulation. One
of the primary ways that the law constitutes intimate relations as intimate is by regulating
how economic resources are exchanged within them.”).
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ing the parties’ business contract, social context has explanatory
power and deserves normative weight. In short, family status
matters.44 
The Article’s argument has four parts. Part I summarizes the
widely accepted view that corporate law is fundamentally contrac-
tual and the application of that view to typical governance conflicts
in close corporations and LLCs. Part II argues that the standard
contractual theory fails to adequately address potential conflicts in
family businesses because it relies upon an impoverished theory of
human behavior. Part III contends that if contract principles can
regulate intimate relationships,45 as some family law scholars have
asserted, corporate law scholars should likewise recognize that
intimacy can substitute for arm’s length contracting in family busi-
nesses, affecting the goals family businesses set and the methods
they adopt to achieve them. Part IV asserts that when conflicts arise
in a family business, courts should give weight to shared family
values relevant to the parties’ expectations. Although some might
object that recognizing overlapping value systems creates indetermi-
nacy and thus undermines the effectiveness of private ordering, the
opposite is true—a clearer appreciation of the family and business
values at stake would help courts respect the parties’ actual choices.
I. CORPORATE LAW’S CONTRACTARIAN FRAMEWORK
Modern corporate law scholarship reflects the profound influence
of law and economics.46 Among its advantages, economic analysis
offers a sophisticated model for analyzing and predicting behavior,
44. Other scholars have recently begun to explore the relevance of family relationships
across traditional legal categories. See, e.g., Alafair S. Burke, When Family Matters, 119 YALE
L.J. 1210, 1212-13 (2010) (reviewing DAN MARKEL ET AL., PRIVILEGE OR PUNISH: CRIMINAL
JUSTICE AND THE CHALLENGE OF FAMILY TIES (2009)); Jeannie Suk, Criminal Law Comes
Home, 116 YALE L.J. 2 (2006).
45. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79, 82 (2001) (“Business models are free of the
antiquated notions of status, morality, and biological relation that have hampered family
law’s ability to adapt with the times.”); Neil G. Williams, What to Do When There’s No “I Do”:
A Model for Awarding Damages Under Promissory Estoppel, 70 WASH. L. REV. 1019, 1047
(1995) (“Modern marriages are ... tantamount to contractual relationships.”).
46. See generally STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, CORPORATION LAW AND ECONOMICS (2002).
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and can inform the design of legal rules and institutions.47 Some
legal scholars further use economics to explore normative goals.48
Part I.A summarizes the law and economics view that business
organization laws provide coherent sets of default rules that eco-
nomically rational individuals can choose among and modify or
supplement as necessary to advance specific goals. Using this
framework, Part I.B describes minority shareholder oppression, the
classic governance problem in closely held businesses, as an issue
of contractual interpretation and enforcement.
A. The Corporate Contract
From the standpoint of law and economics, corporations and other
forms of business organization are best understood as a nexus of
contracts organizing production within the firm, as well as with
external suppliers and customers.49 The arrangements are pre-
sumed to be voluntary and, at least in an economic sense, contrac-
tual.50 First, state laws provide a variety of different entity choices,
each with its own coherent set of default rules.51 Second, rational
47. See, e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1, 13 (1960)
(“Judges have to decide on legal liability but this should not confuse economists about the
nature of the economic problem involved.”).
48. See, e.g., LOUIS KAPLOW & STEVEN SHAVELL, FAIRNESS VERSUS WELFARE (2002); Louis
Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis, 109
HARV. L. REV. 713 (1996).
49. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 8; Steven N.S. Cheung, The Contractual Nature of
the Firm, 26 J.L. & ECON. 1, 10 (1983); Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of
the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
310-11 (1976); Lewis A. Kornhauser, The Nexus of Contracts Approach to Corporations: A
Comment on Easterbrook and Fischel, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1449, 1457 (1989); Jonathan R.
Macey, Fiduciary Duties as Residual Claims: Obligations to Nonshareholder Constituencies
from a Theory of the Firm Perspective, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1266, 1266 (1999) (“[A]ccording to
the law and economics perspective that the nexus-of-contracts approach to corporate law
exemplifies, one should view the corporation as a ‘complex set of explicit and implicit
contracts.’” (quoting Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Corporate Contract, 89
COLUM. L. REV. 1416, 1418 (1989))). The newer LLC form may prove especially conducive to
contractual modification. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 18-1101(b) (West 2012) (“It is the
policy of this chapter to give the maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract.”). 
50. See Jean Braucher, Contract Versus Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of
Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 697, 698 (1990) (“[D]ifficulty is presented by the fact
that contractarian theorists to some extent use the idea of contract metaphorically.”).
51. See Larry E. Ribstein, Why Corporations?, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 232 (2004)
(contending that choice of entity form is part of contractual freedom in business law). 
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individuals seeking to maximize the value of their investment may
negotiate modifications to the default rules.52 Corporate law rules,
then, are mostly “trivial” because they either track what the parties
would have negotiated or are discarded in favor of the parties’ actual
preferences.53
If business organizations are contracts entered into by economi-
cally rational individuals seeking to maximize their own advantage,
it follows that family relationships among investors are not relevant
to the corporate contract unless made an explicit part of the
bargain. That is to say, the law largely ignores social connections
among investors because, as in a classic economic market, “[t]he
parties have no pre-contractual obligations to provide each other
with the goods they exchange.”54 The impersonal nature of “market
relations ... defines a sphere of freedom from personal ties and
obligations.”55 As such, “[t]he market leaves its participants free to
52. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 229 (“[I]t is essential to use
contractual devices to keep people in a position to receive the return on their investment.”);
David Charny, Hypothetical Bargains: The Normative Structure of Contract Interpretation,
89 MICH. L. REV. 1815, 1871 (1991) (“[I]t is generally feasible for the small number of
shareholders in a close corporation to bargain among themselves.”). Of course, not all
corporate law rules can be modified. See Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Structure of Corporation
Law, 89 COLUM. L. REV. 1461, 1487 (1989) (criticizing the contractarian view).
53. See Bernard S. Black, Is Corporate Law Trivial?: A Political and Economic Analysis,
84 NW. U. L. REV. 542, 551-62 (1990). However, in some cases, entity rules are not merely a
convenient substitute for private bargaining but a necessity in light of steep transaction costs.
See, e.g., Henry Hansman et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1340-
41 (2006) (contending that laws shielding entity assets from the creditors of individual
investors efficiently supplant private contracts that would otherwise have to be negotiated
with each such creditor, not to mention the need to monitor fellow investors for opportunistic
neglect of this obligation).
54. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 145 (identifying the moral values associated with market
exchange). To be clear, family members may choose to enter into a business together rather
than with strangers, but this is simply one market choice among others, reflecting a
preference that receives no more and no less weight than any other preference. The family
relationship does not create any legal obligation to enter the business venture, and it does not
change the nature of the rights and obligations assumed.
55. Id. Although the prototypical market exchange “can be completed so as to leave no
unpaid debts on either side [and] leave the parties free to switch trading partners at any
time,” id., shareholders in close corporations typically lock in their capital and cannot
automatically “exit” the transaction. See Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Waiting for
the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations, 24
J. CORP. L. 913, 916 (1999) (“[Absence of public markets] causes the parties to be locked into
their investments to a much greater extent than in either the partnership or the publicly
traded corporation.”). However, this too is the result of a voluntary agreement, the choice of
1198 WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:1185
pursue their individual interests without considering others’
interests. Each party to a market transaction is expected to take
care of herself.”56
The value of the contractarian model depends on its underlying
assumption that individuals are economically rational in that they
consult only their own preferences and pick the best strategy to
advance those preferences.57 Therefore, according to standard law
and economics, “[r]ational individuals invest their human and
money capital with a view to maximizing the value of such re-
sources.”58 In selecting an investment, a rational actor “engages in
an ongoing comparative search for the ... investments that promise
the most attractive return on invested capital given the investor’s
taste for risk.”59
Although presented as a single concept, the two elements of ra-
tional choice can be disaggregated. First, there is the proposition
that individuals are capable of perfectly gathering and processing
information so that their market interactions are the best evidence
of their preferences and also the best avenue for securing the things
that they value. Individuals neither overestimate nor underestimate
risk, and they avoid mental shortcuts in favor of full analysis of each
decision. Call this the “calculating machine” hypothesis. Perhaps
form if nothing else, and serves as a valuable precommitment device. See id. It remains true
that exit is the dominant mechanism. See ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 145 (“[Markets are]
oriented to ‘exit’ rather than ‘voice.’”).
56. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 145. Thus, if higher fiduciary obligations come with
certain forms of business organization, they are voluntarily assumed and logically a part of
the bargain rather than an external constraint upon it.
57. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 23 (“[N]eoclassical economics is premised on
rational choice theory, which posits an autonomous individual who makes rational choices
that maximize his satisfactions.”). A perfectly rational actor would gather the optimal amount
of information and pick the course of action best designed to achieve the ends that she has
selected. See JON ELSTER, EXPLAINING SOCIAL BEHAVIOR: MORE NUTS AND BOLTS FOR THE
SOCIAL SCIENCES 191 (2007) (“[Rational choice theory requires that an] action must be
optimal, given the beliefs; the beliefs must be as well supported as possible, given the
evidence; and the evidence must result from an optimal investment in information
gathering.”); Eric A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Contract Law After Three Decades: Success
or Failure?, 112 YALE L.J. 829, 865 (2003) (“The economic scholarship on contract law
purports to assume that individuals are rational in the sense of neoclassical economics. Their
preferences obey certain consistency requirements, and their cognitive capacity is infinite.”).
58. Charles R. O’Kelley, Jr., Filling Gaps in the Close Corporation Contract: A Transaction
Cost Analysis, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 216, 220 (1992).
59. Id. at 220 n.18.
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because the claim is vulnerable to refutation, many criticisms of
rational-choice economics involve the presentation of evidence that
human beings are not rational in the same way that a thinking
machine would be and, in fact, are systematically irrational.60
A second, distinct assumption is that individuals evaluate infor-
mation and proceed to the best of their ability to maximize their
own advantage.61 Call this the “self-interested actor” hypothesis.
The claim that individuals always act to further their own interests
is the more broadly influential and largely nonfalsifiable aspect of
rational-choice theory.62 Even if individuals make predictable
mistakes in the calculation of their own advantage, it could still be
the case that they are motivated to pursue their own interests.63 If
so, the market’s normative framework still applies and family
relationships have significance only if a rational individual can use
them to lower contracting costs.64
60. See CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky eds., 2000);
Melvin Aron Eisenberg, The Limits of Cognition and the Limits of Contract, 47 STAN. L. REV.
211, 216 (1995); Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: The
Problem of Market Manipulation, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 630, 673 (1999).
61. See John Ferejohn, Rationality and Interpretation: Parliamentary Elections in Early
Stuart England, in THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO POLITICS 279, 281 (Kristin Renwick Monroe
ed., 1991) (“[R]ational choice theorists are committed to a principle of universality: (all) agents
act always to maximize their well-being as they understand it.”).
62. The proposition is tautological and therefore nonfalsifiable in the sense that any goal
can be described in self-interested terms, however badly that mischaracterizes the subjective
understanding of the individual. A soldier who sacrifices his life to save fellow soldiers could
be said to have a preference for heroism, self-sacrifice, or the well-being of his fellow soldiers
that exceeds the marginal utility of his continued existence. However, to describe the sacrifice
as the end product of an internal cost-benefit analysis is to betray very little understanding
of the particular deed and of human motivation in general. Consider, for instance, an account
of First Lieutenant Jonathan Brostrom’s bravery: “[H]e had chosen to leave a place of relative
safety, braving intense fire, and had run ... uphill toward the most perilous point of the fight.
A man does such a thing out of loyalty so consuming that it entirely crowds out consideration
of self.” Mark Bowden, Echoes from a Distant Battlefield, VANITY FAIR, Dec. 2011, at 214.
63. See OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 8 (1996) (“[T]ransaction
cost economics subscribes to and works out of what I see to be the core commitments of
orthodoxy, namely, the combination of a ‘rational spirit’ with a ‘systems’ perspective.”). For
instance, with respect to “bounded rationality,” in which intentions of rationality fall short,
the key insight is that parties can take incompleteness into account. Id. at 9.
64. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 229 (“Participants in closely held
corporations frequently have familial or other personal relations in addition to their business
dealings. The continuous and nonpecuniary nature of these relationships reduces agency
problems.”). For instance, “[t]he bond between parents and children ... constrains conflicts of
interest.” Id. Accordingly, “some of the famous cases dealing with closely held corporations
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B. The Role of Judicial Monitoring
If corporations are contractual, then the role of the courts is to
resolve business disputes by identifying and enforcing the parties’
bargain.65 According to this view, courts provide an oversight mech-
anism but should not adjust the parties’ rights in the name of
fairness, fiduciary duty, or any other concept external to the parties’
contractual relationship. Thus, a key question is whether a court
can go beyond the literal terms of the parties’ agreement as mem-
orialized in various corporate documents, and, if so, what additional
evidence or arguments might sway the court.
For instance, minority shareholders in close corporations are
vulnerable to the risk that the majority owners will abuse their
control to take disproportionate value from the business, sometimes
freezing out minority shareholders from any economic benefit.66 The
economic structure of the problem is clear: in a close corporation,
there are relatively few shareholders, no publicly traded shares, and
typically direct shareholder management.67 Although many close
corporations operate by consensus, majority owners retain the for-
mal power to appoint the board of directors. Mistreated minority
shareholders cannot exit and recover the value of their investment
because the shares are not publicly traded and no rational investor
would pay for the shares of a frozen-out minority.68 With no market
involve situations where these informal bonds have broken down as a result of death, divorce,
or retirement of the patriarch.” Id. at 229-30.
65. See Larry E. Ribstein, From Efficiency to Politics in Contractual Choice of Law, 37 GA.
L. REV. 363, 395 (2003) (“[So long as the parties involved] are motivated to act in their own
interests, bargain freely, and internalize the costs and benefits of the deal, enforcing
contractual choice produces ‘Pareto’ wealth maximization.”). This bargain-enforcement
approach applies even in the absence of a bargain in fact as to a disputed issue. See
EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 245 (“If a court is unavoidably entwined in a
dispute, it must decide what the parties would have agreed to had they written a contract
resolving all contingencies.”); see also Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 89-90 (1989).
66. Similar control problems arise in the LLC. See Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court
in Balancing Contractual Freedom with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic
and Abusive Conduct in the LLC, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1629 (2004). 
67. See 1 F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S CLOSE
CORPORATIONS AND LLCS § 1:2, at 1-6, 1-9 (rev. 3d ed. 2012).
68. See Nixon v. Blackwell, 626 A.2d 1366, 1379 (Del. 1993) (“[T]here is no market and no
market valuation.”); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co. of New Eng., 328 N.E.2d 505, 514
(Mass. 1975) (“In a large public corporation, the oppressed or dissident minority stockholder
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protections readily available, minority investors who have not
negotiated employment agreements, buy-sell provisions, or other
contractual alternatives must depend on the willingness of courts to
intervene and remedy oppression.
Yet, in cases of shareholder oppression, courts are asked to pro-
tect minority shareholders who failed to negotiate adequately to
protect their own interests. At first blush, intervention to provide
special relief for minority shareholders who could have bargained
for protection against majority opportunism appears inconsistent
with a rational-choice, economic model of corporate governance, and
some courts and scholars reject it on precisely this ground.69
Nevertheless, the judicial role may be reconcilable with a thor-
oughly economic approach to contract. In particular, negotiating a
long-term business contract involves significant costs. Therefore, the
right question to ask is not whether private bargaining could have
anticipated and resolved a dispute but whether the cost of such
bargaining would have exceeded its likely benefit. 
Rational actors take transaction costs into account and will
proceed without a fully specified bargain when the anticipated
length and complexity of the relationship make a complete contract
unrealistic.70 At the same time, rational actors expect others to act
could sell his stock in order to extricate some of his invested capital. By definition, this market
is not available for shares in the close corporation.”).
69. See Nixon, 626 A.2d at 1380 (“It would do violence to normal corporate practice ... to
fashion an ad hoc ruling which would result in a court-imposed stockholder buy-out for which
the parties had not contracted.”); Rock & Wachter, supra note 55, at 915 (asking “what, if
anything, the courts should do for the minority shareholders in cases where the parties have
not provided for the problem by contract” and stating as a “basic answer ... that courts should
not do anything except enforce the participants’ contracts and vigorously prevent non pro rata
distributions to shareholders”).
70. Even strict defenders of law and economics admit that complete bargains are often
impossible. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 34 (“Even when they work
through all the issues they expect to arise, [venturers] are apt to miss something. All sorts of
complexities will arise later.”); George G. Triantis, Financial Contract Design in the World of
Venture Capital, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 305, 307 (2001) (reviewing PAUL GOMPERS & JOSH LERNER,
THE VENTURE CAPITAL CYCLE (1999)) (identifying information and agency problems that
prevent parties from reaching complete financial contracts). One difficulty with this
argument, if extended to support a robust doctrine of shareholder oppression, is that certain
protections—such as buy-sell agreements—ought not to be cost prohibitive. Yet, they are not
used as often as might be expected given the lack of exit rights in a close corporation. See Paul
G. Mahoney, Trust and Opportunism in Close Corporations, in CONCENTRATED CORPORATE
OWNERSHIP 177, 189 (Randall K. Morck ed., 2000) (noting that although “[t]here is no large-
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opportunistically and will not invest in a venture at all unless some
alternative form of protection exists.71 Thus, corporate law rules
that constrain opportunism may be economically efficient apart
from any equitable goals they serve.72 Judicial monitoring is not
necessarily an exception to principles of contractual ordering but
only a further recognition that in a market, “[e]ach party values the
other only instrumentally, not intrinsically.”73 
As one scholar explains, judicial monitoring may actually further
the parties’ own intentions even though it involves intervention in
the governance rules that would otherwise apply by default:
The strategy is consistent with courts’ behavior faced with
long-term contracts in which it is prohibitively costly to specify
the parties’ required actions in all states. Legal scholars often
call these transactions relational contracts. Close corporations
fit the paradigm because the parties’ failure to build in specific
protections against the majority appropriating wealth from the
minority is plausibly a result, not of their desire to permit such
appropriation, but rather of the prohibitive cost of writing a
contract to achieve that result. To the extent that courts can
supply implicit contract terms that are consistent with the
parties’ preferences, they can reduce the cost of forming close
corporations.74
This is not, however, an open-ended invitation to courts to rewrite
the parties’ bargain—after all, most matters not specifically ad-
dressed in shareholder agreements are committed to the default
majoritarian rules of corporate law.75 Only in an exceptional case
sample evidence on the extent to which shareholders in closely held corporations bargain for
buyout rights[,] [i]t is widely believed ... that they do so rarely”).
71. See GARY S. BECKER, THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO HUMAN BEHAVIOR 14 (1976)
(“[Individuals] maximize their utility from a stable set of preferences and accumulate an
optimal amount of information and other inputs in a variety of markets.”).
72. See JONATHAN R. MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 22 (2008) (“Fiduciary duties are
part of the contractual nature of the corporation and exist to fill in the blanks and inevitable
oversights in the actual contracts used by business organizations.”).
73. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 154 (distinguishing intimate sexual relationships from
prostitution on the basis of reciprocity, a norm that cannot be fully commodified).
74. Mahoney, supra note 70, at 193 (emphasis omitted) (internal citation omitted).
75. See O’Kelley, supra note 58, at 220.
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involving apparent abuse of control will a court supply a term that
the parties chose not to include.76
Whether one accepts the transaction-cost story as a satisfactory
justification for minority shareholder oppression doctrine or takes
a harder line and advocates letting minority shareholders lie in the
bed that they have made for themselves, family businesses do not
require separate attention under a law and economics approach.
Contracts can concern economic or noneconomic objectives, but the
contractarian model assumes that investors are rational actors who
pursue individual preferences rather than collective goals.77
Further, even though noneconomic goals can be the subject of con-
tract, the overriding focus is generally assumed to be a maximum
return on investment, so that family businesses are just one
possible choice among others, all of which can be measured and
compared along the same economic metric.78 
II. FAMILY BUSINESS AS EMBEDDED ECONOMIC INSTITUTION
This Part contends that the rational-actor model effectively
excludes an entire dimension of moral concern—family values—that
is integral to many family businesses and no less important than
wealth maximization for the long-term health of society. Part II.A
76. It is important to appreciate that minority shareholder oppression almost always
involves extreme facts, in which the minority investor’s stake has been reduced effectively to
nothing. Such cases are very different than ordinary disagreements about business strategy
that are committed to management discretion.
77. See supra Part I.A. Of course, even when family businesses are not at issue, business
decision making may fall well short of the rational-choice model. See Donald C. Langevoort,
The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities Markets, 95 VA. L.
REV. 1025, 1045 (2009) (“As a general matter, ... studies support the idea that investors act
less than fully rationally with enough frequency to cause concern.”); Tor, supra note 11, at
489-90.
78. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 231 (“[I]t is a mistake to conclude that
shareholders in closely held corporations face unique risks of oppression, just as it is wrong
to argue that shareholders in publicly held corporations face unique risks of exploitation
because of the separation of ownership and control. Each organizational form presents its own
problems, for which people have designed different mechanisms of control. At the margin the
problems must be equally severe, the mechanisms equally effective—were it otherwise,
investors would transfer their money from one form to the other until the marginal equality
condition was satisfied. Because the world contains so many different investment vehicles,
none will offer distinctively better chances of return when people can select and shift among
them.”).
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defines family businesses as entities in which a single family has
the power to appoint key managers and at least two family members
actively participate in management or oversight.79 Part II.B argues
that families and businesses have distinct value systems and uses
a three-circle model to specify the overlapping values and social
identities that follow from the possibilities of family membership,
ownership, and active management of the business venture. Part
II.C develops a typology of conflict in family businesses.
A. Defining Family Business
The traditional corporate model assumes diffuse share ownership
with centralized management,80 and yet “[f]amily dominated busi-
nesses comprise more than 80 percent of U.S. enterprises, employ
more than 50 percent of the nation’s workforce, and account for the
bulk ... of America’s gross domestic product.”81 Of course, the precise
economic impact of family business depends on what we mean by
family business, and no single definition has been established.82
Even assuming the narrowest plausible definition, however, the
absence of legal scholarship concerning the governance needs of
family businesses cannot be explained by their lack of economic
importance.83 
79. Although multifamily businesses likely share many similar features, they are beyond
the scope of this Article. Nor do I attempt to ascertain the point at which different branches
of a single family might diverge to the point where it would be more accurate to characterize
a business as multifamily.
80. See generally ADOLF A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND
PRIVATE PROPERTY 66 (rev. ed. 1967); Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Mark J. Roe, A Theory of Path
Dependence in Corporate Ownership and Governance, 52 STAN. L. REV. 127, 149-50 (1999).
81. DWIGHT DRAKE, BUSINESS PLANNING: CLOSELY HELD ENTERPRISES 274 (2d ed. 2008);
see also ERNESTO J. POZA, FAMILY BUSINESS 1 (3d ed. 2004).
82. See COLLI, supra note 23, at 8 (“Contrary to the relatively easy definition of big
business and of the modern managerial corporation, it is not as simple to delineate the
boundaries and features of the family business, even from a ‘residual’ perspective.”); Melissa
Carey Shanker & Joseph H. Astrachan, Myths and Realities: Family Businesses’ Contribution
to the US Economy—A Framework for Assessing Family Business Statistics, 9 FAM. BUS. REV.
107, 107 (1996).
83. See Muntean, supra note 34, at 5 (“Published scholarly work that significantly
understates the dominance of family firms in this country aggravates the perception that
large family controlled firms are a rare exception in the United States, albeit prominent
elsewhere.”).
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This Article adopts a relatively broad definition of family business
that contains two elements. First, the family must have the ability
to control or substantially influence business decisions. Typically,
this would mean the ability to appoint top management. Depending
on the governance structure, a family might have control even
without a majority ownership stake. For instance, through the use
of different classes of stock, a family could retain control of a
business while allowing public investment.84 Further, while direct
participation of family in management or on the board of directors
is the more usual situation, a family business could retain profes-
sional managers without losing its distinctive status—those man-
agers still need to account for the special requirements of family
owners and, ultimately, serve at the pleasure of family owners.
Second, there must be at least two family members who own a
stake in the business or participate in its operation. Without this
qualification, all sole proprietorships would count as family busi-
nesses. Yet, any reasonable understanding of family business re-
quires something more than the fact that a business owner is also
a member of a family. For instance, governance conflicts in family
businesses often turn on a tension between family and work
values—when what is owed depends on whether one stands in a
family or business relation. If only one family member were involved
in the business, other family members would have no greater or
lesser an expectancy in the business than in any other valuable
asset held by that family member.85
Stricter definitions of family business sometimes require either
the involvement of more than one generation or an intention to pass
the business on to succeeding generations.86 These factors can
cement the identification of a family business but are not essential.
84. For a recent article addressing issues of family control in the context of publicly held
corporations, see Deborah A. DeMott, Guests at the Table?: Independent Directors in Family-
Influenced Public Companies, 33 J. CORP. L. 819 (2008).
85. Notably, a family member may be involved in a family business without any formal
ownership stake. For instance, a spouse or child may assist in the development of a business
venture without receiving any shares. For discussion of standing problems that informal
share ownership records can create, see infra Part IV.C.1.
86. See Danny Miller & Isabelle Le Breton-Miller, Challenge Versus Advantage in Family
Business, STRATEGIC ORG., Feb. 2003, at 127 (defining family firm as “one in which a family
has enough ownership to determine the composition of the board, where the CEO and at least
one other top executive is a family member, and where the intent is to pass the firm on to the
next generation”).
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For instance, if multiple generations were deemed necessary, a
business owned and operated jointly by a married couple would not
qualify as a family business, even though the co-owners have
overlapping business and family obligations to one another. The
definition, based on an intention to maintain family ownership,
captures something important but could be difficult to assess. Also,
even assuming perfect information, the test seems too restrictive—a
business might be run with substantial family involvement, con-
sistent with family values, and for the benefit of family, and yet the
founder might reserve judgment as to whether it would best serve
the interests of the family to sell the business or pass it down to a
next generation of family owners.
Finally, any definition of family business presupposes a definition
of family.87 The scope of recognized kinship ties varies across
cultures.88 However, for purposes of this Article’s focus on family
business governance, what matters is not so much a formal defi-
nition of family but whether the business participants understand
themselves to be members of a family.89 In the first generation, the
key individuals will usually be part of the same immediate family.
If the business survives to a second generation, there will often be
an association of siblings. By the third generation, many family
businesses are owned by a consortium of cousins. Thus, for present
purposes, there is no need to consider the boundaries of family life,
87. According to one scholar, a family is a “patterned system to distribute the obligations
for dependent individuals (children and the elderly).” Steven L. Nock, Time and Gender in
Marriage, 86 VA. L. REV. 1971, 1972 (2000). However, the boundaries of family life can be
difficult to ascertain. See generally Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who’s In and Who’s
Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269 (1991); Laura A. Rosenbury, Between Home and School, 155 U.
PA. L. REV. 833 (2007).
88. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH 63 (2004) (“[I]f the family is
constructed through interaction with the state and society, the family cannot be posited as a
‘natural’ entity with a form that is constant over time and culture.”).
89. In other words, it is not so much a literal test of kinship; rather, it is a measurement
of the boundaries of reciprocal obligations to cooperate and to provide mutual support. One
scholar observes that there may be at least a rough analogy between boundaries of
cooperation in a family and the make-or-buy decision that forms the boundary between firms
and markets. See Saul Levmore, Competition and Cooperation, 97 MICH. L. REV. 216, 219-20
(1998). Although beyond the scope of this Article, it might be interesting to develop a
conception of boundaries that could shed light on family businesses as a locus of market and
nonmarket cooperation. 
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and we may assume that it is possible to identify a distinct group of
family businesses.90
B. Overlapping Values
Family businesses present distinctive challenges because they
combine the values and expectations of the workplace with more
intimate family bonds. Before industrialization, when many people
lived and worked on family farms, there was little distance between
home and work, both literally and figuratively.91 The modern
workplace, however, refers not only to a physical location, but also
a distinct culture with its own language, expected behavior, and
value system.92 In the context of family businesses, workplace
values and family values interact in complex ways, and an analysis
of the law’s application to such businesses should take this interac-
tion into account.
1. Social Identity Theory
According to social identity theory, people use social roles to
“categorize themselves and others as a means of ordering the social
environment and locating themselves and others within it.”93 Thus,
90. Professor Muntean concludes that many definitions of family business seem to be
“unnecessarily strict.” Muntean, supra note 34, at 13. For instance, one survey of family
businesses only lists “those firms in which a single family has members actively engaged in
the management of operations and are at least in the second generation of management.” Id.
at 14. But the definition leaves out “corporations in which more than one family owns and
controls the firm[,] ... family businesses in the first generation[, and] ... family owned and
controlled firms in which family members are no longer managing the daily operations of the
firm.” Id. Further, it may be that some of the same concerns would apply to fiduciary-like
bonds among friends. See generally ETHAN J. LIEB, FRIEND V. FRIEND: THE TRANSFORMATION
OF FRIENDSHIP—AND WHAT THE LAW HAS TO DO WITH IT (2011); Laura A. Rosenbury, Friends
with Benefits?, 106 MICH. L. REV. 189 (2007). This Article does not seek to extend the analysis
to nonfamily businesses and, to the contrary, assumes that families are normatively distinct
in ways that the law should recognize.
91. See NANCY F. COTT, THE BONDS OF WOMANHOOD 1780-1835, at 22 (2d ed. 1997).
92. See BLAKE E. ASHFORTH, ROLE TRANSITIONS IN ORGANIZATIONAL LIFE 1 (2001) (stating
that “individuals must often enter organizations and adopt more or less formal roles” in order
to accomplish tasks that were once handled more informally at home or in the community).
For instance, exercise may take place in the formal setting of a health club. Id.
93. Id. at 24. Additionally, the theory contends that “[b]y identifying, individuals perceive
themselves as psychologically intertwined with the fate of the social category or role, sharing
its common destiny, and experiencing its successes and failures.” Id. at 25.
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“[s]ocial role differentiation, in enabling people to occupy different
roles at different times and places, enables them to establish dif-
ferent priorities in different parts of their lives.”94 These roles are
not casually adopted: “Experiences are constrained and filtered
through institutionalized structures such that the very sense of self
in many situations is derived largely from the role one is enacting.”95
For instance, “when individuals are asked ‘Who are you?’, they
typically respond in terms of social categories (e.g., female, wife,
French, lawyer).”96 Each of these social identities contains certain
“core or central features and peripheral features.”97
A role, taken by itself, may be clear and well-defined. Family
roles, for instance, follow a script that most people know by heart:
The most obvious and well-established examples of standard-
ized relationships in western culture are those that exist within
the family. It is a fair assumption that most people share a
generalized understanding of the various duties and obligations
that attach to each particular familial role, although there is a
wide variety of behavior within specific relationships. To be sure,
the specific understanding of particular roles has changed
drastically in the last thirty years. But it is safe to say that it is
generally assumed that parents will provide their children with
love, financial support, and some degree of education[;] ... that
children will strive to be respectful to their parents and act in a
way that pleases them; that older children will care for aging
parents; that husbands and wives will be each other’s primary
source of emotional support; and that family members will act
to benefit the whole—or at least refrain from causing harm to
other members.98
94. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 25.
95. See ASHFORTH, supra note 92, at 1. This is not to say that people lack distinct
psychological features or that social roles completely determine identity: “The personal
identity often emerges in juxtaposition to valued social/role identities as the individual seeks
some distinctiveness within the homogenizing context of the collectivity.” Id. at 34 (citing M.B.
Brewer, The Social Self: On Being the Same and Different at the Same Time, 17 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 475 (1991)).
96. Id. at 27.
97. Id.
98. Melanie B. Leslie, Enforcing Family Promises: Reliance, Reciprocity, and Relational
Contract, 77 N.C. L. REV. 551, 581 (1999) (footnote omitted).
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Social roles, however, pose two related challenges for participants
in family businesses. First, although “roles are typically associated
with differentiated social domains” and “differentiated audiences,”99
family businesses conflate family and workplace categories. An
employer-employee relationship may also be a parent-child relation-
ship. Thus, it may be unclear which role should take precedence in
any given situation.100 The expectations that we have of members of
our family—that we will put the family’s interests first, that we will
take care of each other—may conflict with the goal of maximizing
economic return in a business.101 To the extent the social roles are
incompatible, family business has a built-in conflict.
Second, individuals must be able to transition effectively between
roles. When role identities make different demands, transitions may
be difficult to accomplish on a daily basis.102 Role transitions over
longer periods of time can also be difficult. Most important, it can be
very hard for one generation to cede control to the next because
work and family are linked—stepping down as CEO may feel like a
surrender of status as a family patriarch or matriarch.103 Or, alter-
natively, the power structure of the family system may work at odds
with any changes of control contemplated in the business.104 Tension
associated with role transitions helps explain why family businesses
99. ASHFORTH, supra note 92, at 27; see also id. at 26 (“When interacting with another
person, one necessarily occupies a particular role such as friend, spouse, or coworker.”). As
Professor Ashforth observes, even when the domains are distinct, the various social roles may
create “interrole conflict and the fragmentation of self.” Id. at 2 (citing K.J. GERGEN, THE
SATURATED SELF (1991); L.A. ZURCHER, JR., THE MUTABLE SELF (1977)).
100. See ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 25 (observing that a parent’s choice of whether to
focus on a “child’s demands for attention” or a “client’s needs” may depend on whether the
parent is “at home or at work”). Professor Anderson further observes that these decision
frames are not typically gender neutral because society “assigns different meanings to
mothers and fathers making the same tradeoffs of work and parental responsibilities.” Id.
101. See, e.g., Lansberg, supra note 4, at 42 (noting that, regardless of merit, “it is assumed
that in allocations among siblings, each individual is entitled to an equal share of resources
and opportunities”).
102. See ASHFORTH, supra note 92, at 7.
103. Id. at 3 (“How does a newly retired chief execute officer (CEO) cope with the loss of
identity and status?”).
104. See F. HODGE O’NEAL & ROBERT B. THOMPSON, O’NEAL AND THOMPSON’S OPPRESSION
OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS AND LLC MEMBERS § 3:1, at 3-2 (rev. 2d ed. 2012) (explaining
squeeze-out techniques, which can be used during generational transfers); Lansberg, supra
note 4, at 43. It may also be difficult for a parent to appreciate that a child has grown and is
ready to assume full adult responsibilities.
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are often most vulnerable to internal dissension when control must
be transferred across generations.105
Social identity theory explains why the interconnection of family
and business value systems can create conflict in family businesses;
individuals may find themselves torn between advancing the
interests of the business and upholding their obligations as mem-
bers of a family. Even if these social identities seem to align, or can
be made to do so, the possibility of conflict always exists, especially
during periods of business transition. Thus, “[a] better understand-
ing of how family relationships influence behavior more generally
promises to improve our understanding of the organizational and
strategic choices made in the family-controlled firm.”106
2. The Three-Circle Model
Role conflicts aside, certain fundamental issues cause problems
at the institutional level in family businesses: Should the family
business guarantee employment for family members, even if more
qualified workers can be found elsewhere? Should managerial
control be vested in an outsider? Should distributions of dividends
be increased to meet family needs if the business also needs the
resources to grow?107 Families and businesses may have different
institutional goals and values.108
Further complications ensue when some family members par-
ticipate in the management of the business while others become
passive investors.109 The management literature represents these
dynamics visually with a Venn diagram.110 The three-circle model
105. See supra note 26 and accompanying text; infra notes 128-34 and accompanying text.
106. Muntean, supra note 34, at 18.
107. One way to reduce institutional conflict is to encourage business-owning families to
establish written goals. As one business advisor recounts, “In my work with family business
owners, I ask the question: ‘Do you have goals or business plans in which the specifics are
described in writing?’ Usually fewer than 10 percent have such a document.” BORK, supra note
42, at 142. The advisor claims that “[t]he value of agreed-upon goals should be obvious. They
focus the energy of all people on specific objectives. Also, written goals can be referenced.” Id.
108. See SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 76 (“A fundamentally paradoxical feature of
family business is that families tend to be socialistic, while businesses are firmly
capitalistic.”).
109. See id. at 77.
110. See GERSICK ET AL., supra note 16, at 6 fig.I-I; SCHUMAN ET AL., supra note 20, at 77
fig.4.1. The three-circle model was first developed by Renato Tagiuri and John Davis. See
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includes family business conflict and extends the analysis to include
“a critical distinction between the ownership and management
subsystems within the business circle.”111 The three-circle model is
as follows:
According to the model, individuals can be placed into one of seven
possible positions: (1)  family membership with share ownership
and active participation in company management; (2) family
membership with active participation in management but no share
ownership; (3) share ownership and management but no family
membership; (4) family membership with share ownership but no
management participation; (5) family membership only; (6) manage-
ment only; and (7) share ownership only. The three-circle model
illustrates the variety of distinct roles in a family business, each
with its own set of expectations and responsibilities.112
Bivalent Attributes of the Family Firm, 9 FAM. BUS. REV. 199, 200 fig.1 (1996).
111. GERSICK ET AL., supra note 16, at 5 (“That is, some individuals are owners but not
involved in the operation of the business; others are managers but do not control shares.”).
112. See id. at 6-7 & fig.I-I. Consider what happens when a nonfamily member marries
someone in the family and is brought into the business and given an ownership stake but then
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C. A Conflict Typology 
Most shareholder oppression claims in family businesses appear
to fit one of two general patterns: either a “spillover” family dispute
in which the intersection of work and family is not itself a causal
factor, or a problem concerning the prioritization of family and
business values. In the latter case, it helps to identify whether
family-management, family-ownership, or management-ownership
intersections are at issue.113 In any area of overlap, dissension may
result either when family values are given precedence or when a
refusal to credit family obligations stirs resentment.114
1. “Spillover” Oppression
A family business creates a feedback mechanism in which the
strength of family bonds can provide support for the business and
a successful business can help the family thrive.115 However,
feedback loops can be negative as well as positive. Breakdowns in
family relationships can cause havoc in the workplace.116 Marital
dissolution represents one clear example, but damaged families
come in all varieties.117 However they start, family problems can
gets divorced. If the marital separation also ends any further affiliation with the family, we
would say that the individual has moved from position one to position three. By inviting
comparison with other individuals in the same category, the three-circle model can be used
to ask whether later difficulties result from the divorce or the fact of share ownership by a
nonfamily member in a family business.
113. Id. at 7.
114. Although beyond the scope of this Article, the categories set forth in the three-circle
model might be useful as a foundation for empirical research into the causes of legal conflict
in closely held businesses.
115. Feedback denotes “the return to the input of a part of the output of a machine, system,
or process.” Definition of Feedback, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/
dictionary/feedback (last visited Feb. 9, 2013). Family relationships drive business dealings,
which in turn affect family relationships.
116. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 104, § 2:2, at 2-5 (“[B]usiness relationships often
overlap family relationships so that a squeeze often reflects dysfunctional family relations or
is exacerbated by family relations.”).
117. See LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky trans.,
Viking Penguin 2001) (1877) (“All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy
in its own way.”). There is some irony in citing Tolstoy’s dictum on the infinite varieties of
family misery in a section that purports to enumerate, if only in a general fashion, certain
representative types of family business disputes. Still, there may be reasons to categorize for
legal purposes that which art keeps separate.
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become business problems, and business disagreements can further
sour family relations.118
Many examples support this contention. In one case, the court
observed that the minority shareholder was excluded from the
business possibly as “retaliation for the problems occurring between
the siblings.”119 In another case, the plaintiff’s marriage “resulted in
problems with the relationship with his parents [that] ... affected
the family’s operation of its business and resulted in ... litigation.”120
Or consider the total breakdown in relations among the members of
the Shoen family that controlled U-Haul: adult children alienated
by their father’s hasty remarriage after their mother’s death, false
insinuations that a family member who served as CEO had mur-
dered his wife, fistfights among brothers, and other assorted may-
hem all contributed to an atmosphere of dissension and distrust
that led to protracted shareholder litigation.121 
Spillover disputes do not fall within any plausible model of
rational behavior, let alone the refined assumptions of rational-
choice theory.122 If corporate law scholars proceed as though busi-
ness participants are unfailingly rational and that businesses can
be analyzed without any appreciation of their social context, then
corporate scholars can offer little insight or guidance in disputes
that stem from family grievances. A narrow focus on how economi-
cally rational actors would allocate risk in an ongoing business
venture illuminates neither the potential sources of conflict for a
venture situated within family relationships nor the potential
methods for resolving such conflict.123
118. See O’NEAL & THOMPSON, supra note 104, § 2:2, at 2-5.
119. Mueller v. Cedar Shore Resort, Inc., 643 N.W.2d 56, 65 (S.D. 2002).
120. Berger v. Berger, 592 A.2d 321, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991).
121. See GRANT GORDON & NIGEL NICHOLSON, FAMILY WARS: STORIES AND INSIGHTS FROM
FAMOUS FAMILY BUSINESS FEUDS 192-208 (2008). The authors conclude: “In short, the Shoen
family dynamic was totally dysfunctional.” Id. at 199.
122. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
123. Exit, the standard answer to business conflict, assumes that the damage to
relationships is irreparable. See Z. CHRISTOPHER MERCER, BUY-SELL AGREEMENTS FOR
CLOSELY HELD AND FAMILY BUSINESS OWNERS (2010).
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2. Incompatible Values
Conflicts can also arise at the intersection of business and family
values rather than from a rupture within either of those two sys-
tems. The three-circle model illustrates the main areas of overlap,
in which family values affect share ownership and business
management. Many shareholder disputes stem from a prioritization
of family needs over business interests, for instance, by dividing
control equally among siblings, regardless of ability,124 or expropri-
ating business assets and distributing them to members of the
family to the exclusion of nonfamily or more distantly related
minority shareholders. Hard feelings can also be created when
business values take precedence and those in control of a family
business give no consideration to family allegiances. For instance,
if a family member’s competence as a member of the business is
judged without regard to family status, that individual may feel that
she has been singled out for mistreatment.125 Likewise, decisions to
withhold dividends can cause turmoil, especially if not all family
members receive a salary.126
Tensions between business goals and family values are likely to
be exacerbated if only some family members work for the business.
According to one commentator, the key to avoiding ownership-
management conflict and aligning interests is making sure that all
family shareholders are also active participants in the business: “As
a general principle, countless problems can be avoided if family
124. See GERSICK ET AL., supra note 16, at 206. Professor Lansberg notes that these
situations arise when a founder cannot reconcile the competing value systems and tries to
split the difference. Lansberg, supra note 4, at 44 (“These compromises, however, often lead
to decisions that are suboptimal from a management point of view.”). Lansberg gives an
example of how a coping strategy based on compromise can go awry:
[O]ne founder who was unable to choose between his son and a professional
manager as his successor decided to split the office of chief executive into two
distinct offices, giving one to his son and one to the professional manager. In this
case the founder’s “solution” led to a power struggle between the two that
threatened the firm’s long-term survival.
Id.
125. See Lansberg, supra note 4, at 43 (“It is not surprising ... that a founder faced with
having to assess the managerial competence of his or her own offspring experiences a great
deal of stress because it is not possible simultaneously to do justice to the norms and
prescriptions that operate in the family and in the business systems.”).
126. Cf. Mahoney, supra note 70, at 189 (providing examples of turmoil and showing
judges’ difficulties in attempting to reach fair outcomes).
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members who do not intend to be active in the business are not left
stock in it. The interests of inactive members are antithetical to
those of active family members. Simply stated, inactive owners
usually want cash.”127
Nowhere are the difficulties of balancing family and business
values more formidable than in the transfer of control from one
generation to the next.128 The transition may be difficult psychologi-
cally for an individual who has devoted her full energies to the busi-
ness and now faces decline and eventual death.129 Yet, “[i]nevitably,
individual and company life cycles must diverge.”130 To effect a
transition, many considerations are involved:
The owners must formulate a vision of a future governance
structure and decide how to divide ownership to conform with
that structure. They must develop and train potential manage-
ment successors and set up a process for selecting the most
qualified leaders. They must overcome any resistance to letting
go that the seniors may have and help the new leadership
establish its authority with various stakeholders.131
One of the most important decisions is whether to transfer
ownership control to a single person or divide it equally among
heirs.132 The choice may be affected by the pull of family and busi-
ness ownership values. For instance, strong family values concern-
ing equal treatment of children may lead to a variety of strategies
for shared management and ownership in succeeding generations.
In some cases, however, co-ownership may not be a successful busi-
ness strategy, even if it affirms important family values concerning
the equal worth of each child.133 As the number of owners expands,
127. BORK, supra note 42, at 129.
128. GERSICK ET AL., supra note 16, at 193 (“Succession is the ultimate test of a family
business.”).
129. ASHFORTH, supra note 92, at 13 (“[T]he more the individual is involved in and
identifies with work, the more consequential and potentially taxing the transition process
tends to be for the individual.”).
130. GERSICK ET AL., supra note 16, at 193.
131. Id. at 194.
132. See id. at 206.
133. See id. On the other hand, “[t]he idea that one and only one individual should be the
leader is steeped in the rich imagery of the hero in Western culture.” Id. at 204. In fact,
“[f]amilies that choose a Controlling Owner structure for the next generation are betting the
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the prospects for consensus-based decision making decline. Yet,
selecting a single leader while treating other family members fairly
becomes more difficult with each generation the business sur-
vives.134 
In sum, family relationships are central to our understanding of
family businesses—a person’s rights and responsibilities depend on
where she is in the family and business hierarchies.135 Although
business relationships turn on productivity and merit, “[t]he
standing of an individual in a family is determined more by who the
individual ‘is’ than by what the individual ‘does.’”136 In order to
design effective legal principles for evaluating and remedying
business conflict, it is important to first understand the institutional
context to which they will be applied. For family businesses, that
means appreciating the overlapping demands of family and business
values and the ways that individuals—depending on their position
within the family, ownership, and management structure—may
interpret their competing obligations.
III. CONTRACT AND STATUS IN PRIVATE ORDERING
Progress in modern life, whether economic or social, has some-
times been described as a move from preordained status relations
store and the family fortune on the leadership talent, business acumen, and emotional
maturity of one person.” Id. at 205. This risk must be weighed against the management
benefit that follows from clear control—“[i]t permits decisive action, often critical when a
company must move quickly to capture markets or beat competitors.” Id. at 204.
134. To be effective, the choice of leadership must be combined with “a mechanism for
concentrating the stock in the single successor’s hands.” Id. at 205. However, if “the business
is the primary asset, this raises fundamental questions of fairness in distribution of the
family’s wealth.” Id. Splitting the difference by designating a successor but “dividing
ownership among the sibling group, and instructing them ... to support the business leader”
is a recipe for disaster. Id. at 206.
135. Indeed, economic action is always “embedded” in social context and “takes place within
the networks of social relations that make up the social structure.” Neil J. Smelser & Richard
Swedberg, The Sociological Perspective on the Economy, in THE HANDBOOK OF ECONOMIC
SOCIOLOGY 3, 18 (Neil J. Smelser & Richard Swedberg eds., 1994). In the case of family
businesses, the interaction of social networks and business objectives may be complex,
because family values are sometimes in tension with ordinary business objectives. ASHFORTH,
supra note 92, at 139 (“Work and home are often stereotypically perceived as opposites on
many dimensions.”).
136. Lansberg, supra note 4, at 43 (“Applying a set of objectively derived criteria to
evaluate a family member’s performance goes against the very principles that regulate and
define social behavior in the family.”).
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to voluntary contract.137 Over time, restrictive castes tend to give
way to flexible private ordering based on consent. In its teleological
account of the development of human societies,138 however, the
status-to-contract thesis overstates its case. First, although markets
enable individuals to make choices consistent with their prefer-
ences, there are “certain kinds of valuations that can be expressed
only in nonmarket social relations.”139 Second, the thesis assumes
a radical distinction between “status” and “contract” that ignores
the larger sense in which both are culturally constructed and deeply
interrelated: the traditional rights and duties of marriage, for
instance, are cast in the form of a contractual covenant. 
This Part contends that contract and status are complementary
mechanisms in family businesses. Social norms derived from family
status are not extraneous to contractual analysis; rather, they pro-
vide a common cultural context in which specific bargains and
background legal principles operate.140 Part III.A examines a
corollary argument advanced by family law scholars who advocate
the use of contract principles, sometimes explicitly derived from
business organization law, to diminish status-based constraints in
family law that reflect outdated norms and entrenched inequality.
Part III.B contends that if contractual mechanisms are under-
appreciated in family life, social status and hierarchy have not
received their due as precepts that may be relied upon to structure
137. See SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 140 (Dorset Press 1986) (1861) (“Nor is
it difficult to see what is the tie between man and man which replaces by degrees those forms
of reciprocity in rights and duties which have their origin in the Family. It is Contract.”);
Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Age of Aquarius or, How I (Almost) Learned to Stop Worrying and
Love Free Markets, 88 MINN. L. REV. 921, 944 (2004) (reviewing RAGHURAM G. RAJAN & LUIGI
ZINGALES, SAVING CAPITALISM FROM THE CAPITALISTS (2003)) (“In little more than a
generation, the structure of American society has changed, as an age of hierarchy has given
way to an age of markets.”).
138. MAINE, supra note 137, at 140-41 (“Starting, as from one terminus of history, from a
condition of society in which all the relations of Persons are summed up in the relations of
Family, we seem to have steadily moved towards a phase of social order in which all these
relations arise from the free agreement of Individuals.... [W]e may say that the movement of
the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract.” (emphasis
omitted)).
139. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 211.
140. See generally Richard H. McAdams, The Origin, Development, and Regulation of
Norms, 96 MICH. L. REV. 338 (1997).
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voluntary business relationships.141 Connections between family and
business law run in both directions.
A. Family Law Contractualism
The laws governing marriage and other family institutions reflect
strong intuitions about what our shared lives should look like.142 By
entering a marriage contract, a couple agrees to be bound together
in a relationship of mutual support—a voluntary assumption of
status obligations.143 Indeed, legally enforceable private ordering
within a marriage was once thought to be a conceptual impossibil-
ity: 
By marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law....
For this reason, a man cannot grant any thing to his wife, or
enter into covenant with her: for the grant would be to suppose
141. By status and hierarchy, I mean preexisting social facts rather than hierarchies that
are, themselves, established contractually. Cf. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 200 (contending
that hierarchy in corporations does not refute the nexus-of-contracts theory); R.H. Coase, The
Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 388 (1937) (distinguishing arm’s-length market
transactions from hierarchical ordering in a firm: the make-or-buy decision). Recently, some
scholars have argued that hierarchies within firms cannot fully be understood within a nexus-
of-contracts framework. See, e.g., Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the
Corporation, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85, 92 (Claire
A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell eds., 2012) (“The nexus of contract theory is thus not really a
theory of the firm at all, but rather a theory of agency costs within a certain type of firm.”
(citing Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, Islands of Conscious Power: Law, Norms, and
the Self-Governing Corporation, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1619, 1624 (2001))). 
142. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Changing Name Changing: Framing Rules and the
Future of Marital Names, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 775-76 (2007) (describing previous
mandatory regime that imposed name change on women after marriage and contending that
current default rules are incomplete in that they focus solely on a woman’s decision to keep
or change her last name); Shahar Lifshitz, Married Against Their Will? Toward a Pluralist
Regulation of Spousal Relationships, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1565, 1597 (2009)
(“Traditionally, legal regulation of marriage expressed and supported shared moral principles
and interests of society as a whole, sometimes even at the cost of limiting the couple’s
freedoms.” (citation omitted)). Professor Emens observes that “the social meanings
surrounding names, and marital names in particular, make any change of name at marriage
a very costly decision for men.” Emens, supra, at 776.
143. Viewed economically, “marriage” has been defined as “a written, oral, or customary
long-term contract between a man and a woman to produce children, food, and other
commodities in a common household.” GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY 43
(enlarged ed. 1991).
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her separate existence; and to covenant with her, would be only
to covenant with himself.144
The terms of the marriage contract—which purported to dissolve the
individual identities the contract itself presupposed—were set by
law and not subject to alteration.145 As a matter of public policy,
bargains that affected the parties’ rights during the life of the
marriage were unenforceable.146 The hostility to private ordering
within a marital relationship has not dissipated altogether147 and
seems to reflect an idealized conception in which “the family is at
least in theory the last surviving haven from the relentless spread
of markets and commodification.”148
However, negotiated contractual bargains have become more
common in intimate relationships and “[f]amily law doctrine in-
creasingly favors private ordering in matters such as entry into
marriage, contractual ordering of marriage, nonmarital relation-
ships, divorce, adoption, the use of reproductive technologies, and
the privatization of domestic relations dispute resolution.”149 For
instance, the Uniform Premarital Agreement Act contemplates
that couples may contract regarding “any ... matter, including
their personal rights and obligations, not in violation of public
policy.”150 Courts have also enforced agreements between nonmar-
ried couples.151 
144. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *430 (footnote omitted).
145. See FINEMAN, supra note 88, at 60. The mandatory status relations set by statute
reflected a cultural norm of male dominance. See Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife
Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2122-23 (1996).
146. See, e.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336, 342 (Neb. 1953).
147. See Mary Anne Case, Enforcing Bargains in an Ongoing Marriage, 35 WASH. U. J.L.
& POL’Y 225, 225 (2011) (contending that “even as the laws governing marriage in the United
States have moved farther along the spectrum from status to contract,” courts remain
reluctant to enforce contracts during the life of a marriage); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E.
Scott, Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225, 1303 (1998) (same).
148. Teemu Ruskola, Home Economics: What Is the Difference Between a Family and a
Corporation?, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION 324, 324 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C.
Williams eds., 2005); see also Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARV.
L. REV. 353, 371 (1978) (contending that in a marriage “successful human association depends
upon spontaneous and informal collaboration” and that courts therefore “refuse[ ] to enforce
agreements between husband and wife affecting the internal organization of family life”).
149. Ertman, supra note 45, at 81-82.
150. UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT § 3(a)(8), 9C U.L.A. 43 (2001).
151. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 122 (Cal. 1976).
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Even if doubts remain concerning the introduction of contractual
principles into supposedly nonmarket family institutions, expanding
the range of available choices in the domestic sphere is not the same
thing as treating family relationships as fungible, market com-
modities. For instance, family law scholars have explored contract
as a potential mechanism for enhancing individual autonomy and
for counteracting issues of gender or other social inequality.152
Depending on their situation, individuals might “use private
agreements to reinforce their marital commitment”153 or to create
structures for intimate relationships that fall outside of existing
recognized categories.154
In some respects, the gradual recognition of contractual bargain-
ing within domestic relationships resembles the process by which
courts became willing to enforce shareholder agreements in close
corporations, even when those agreements altered central features
of corporate law such as the authority of the board of directors.155
For example, in McQuade v. Stoneham, the New York Court of
Appeals refused to enforce an intrashareholder contract that
infringed upon the board of directors’ ability to manage the cor-
poration according to its sole judgment.156 Yet, in Clark v. Dodge,
decided only two years later, the same court concluded that a
shareholder arrangement that protected the investment interest of
152. See Ertman, supra note 45, at 82 (“Business models are free of the antiquated notions
of status, morality, and biological relation that have hampered family law’s ability to adapt
with the times.”). I do not mean to suggest that all contracts should be enforceable, regardless
of their terms. See, e.g., Spires v. Spires, 743 A.2d 186, 187-88 (D.C. 1999) (rejecting marital
contract that purported to effectively enslave the wife). As Professor Case points out, courts
are “an appropriate forum, far better than many alternatives, to deal with bargains such as
the Spires’ ‘Marital Agreement.’” Case, supra note 147, at 247.
153. See Elizabth S. Scott, Social Norms and the Legal Regulation of Marriage, 86 VA. L.
REV. 1901, 1903 (2000) (stating additionally that such agreements face “continuing
reluctance” and that “[f]ew courts, for example, would enforce a premarital agreement
incorporating covenant marriage terms” (citing Theodore F. Haas, The Rationality and
Enforceablility of Contractual Restrictions on Divorce, 66 N.C. L. REV. 879, 901-04 (1988))).
154. See Elizabeth I. Emens, Monagamy’s Law: Compulsory Monogamy and Polyamorous
Existence, 29 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277, 364 (2004).
155. The enforceability of shareholder agreements in closely held corporations is now
codified, but it evolved through a process of common law interpretation of existing, apparently
mandatory, corporate law rules. See BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 808.
156. 189 N.E. 234, 237 (N.Y. 1934). The court nevertheless recognized that “such
agreements, tacitly or openly arrived at, are not uncommon, especially in close corporations
where the stockholders are doing business for convenience under a corporate organization.”
Id. at 236.
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the minority shareholder only “impinge[d] slightly” upon the board’s
statutory authority and would be upheld.157 State corporate law
statutes now generally recognize the value of tailored investment
agreements and permit shareholders in close corporations to
contract with each other, even if those contracts remove certain
decisions from the board.158
Families, like businesses, are entities composed of individuals
who seek to achieve joint purposes, and it seems logical to look to
business law to find helpful models for contractual ordering in the
family context.159 As one family law scholar has observed:
The law governing intimate relationships would benefit from
exploring the metaphorical and doctrinal analogies between
business and intimate affiliations. These analogies bridge the ...
distinction by drawing connections between private business law
and private family law. They also improve upon conventional
family law’s understanding of family. The exploration remedies
long-standing inequities within current family law discourse
that are fossilized artifacts of the naturalized construction of
intimate relationships.160
There are a number of specific, structural similarities between
close corporations and marriages. First, “close corporations and
marriages are intended to be ‘long-term, ongoing entities’ that
require ‘stability and predictability to function properly.’”161 Second,
each form of social organization requires formal state recognition.162
157. 199 N.E. 641, 642-43 (N.Y. 1936).
158. See Ian Ayres, Judging Close Corporations in the Age of Statutes, 70 WASH. U. L.Q.
365, 370 (1992) (“The nullification of certain Procrustean, immutable provisions by a few
individual state courts not only initiated a dialogue with the legislatures of those states, but
also conveyed information that motivated action by other state legislatures.”).
159. Mary Anne Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1758, 1779 (2005)
(noting reduction in mandatory regulation of marriages and business entities); Adrienne D.
Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1998-2032 (2010) (proposing a partnership framework for intimate
relationships among multiple partners); Ertman, supra note 45, at 79-80; Jana B. Singer, The
Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443, 1445.
160. Ertman, supra note 45, at 79-80 (footnote omitted).
161. Id. at 112 (quoting Note, In Sickness and in Health, in Hawaii and Where Else?:
Conflict of Laws and Recognition of Same-Sex Marriages, 109 HARV. L. REV. 2038, 2053
(1998)).
162. See id. at 112-13.
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Third, the dissolution of a business “parallels divorce.”163 Moreover,
“a close corporation often is a hybrid of family and business that
bridges the ... divide by its very existence.”164 Thus, families and
businesses can be described as long-term, relational contracts; an
analogy that extends to matters of formation, governance, distribu-
tion, and dissolution.165 
B. From Contract to Context
According to current orthodoxy in corporate law, cogently sum-
marized by the Chief Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court,
“[C]ourts need to be mindful of the distinction between status
relationships and contractual relationships.”166 In the event of a
dispute, “the contractual relationship between parties ... should be
the analytical focus[,] ... not the status relationship of the parties.”167
Chief Justice Steele’s recommended approach assumes that status
and contract are defined in opposition to one another and lack
legally relevant intersections.168 The premise of his argument is
flawed, at least when applied to family businesses, because it fails
163. Id. at 118. Professor Ertman explains that “[l]ike a minority shareholder, a disad-
vantaged spouse (often a woman) takes a serious financial risk when exiting marriage.” Id.
at 115.
164. Id.
165. The analogy does not require us to ignore substantial differences that remain between
family and business institutions. See MARGARET F. BRINIG, FROM CONTRACT TO COVENANT:
BEYOND THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY 77-79 (2000) (identifying the limits of
commodification-based analysis). As a consequence, we should not expect existing forms of
business organization to provide an adequate template for all matters now covered by
domestic relations law. See Larry E. Ribstein, Incorporating the Hendricksons, 35 WASH. U.
J.L. & POL’Y 273, 276 (2011) (“[E]ven if a contractual model of the family is appropriate on
policy grounds, the differences between business associations and domestic relationships
likely would continue to demand qualitatively different standard forms.”).
166. Myron T. Steele, Judicial Scrutiny of Fiduciary Duties in Delaware Limited
Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies, 32 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 9 (2007).
167. Id. at 25.
168. Chief Justice Steele’s conclusion that individuals’ intimate relationships are distinct
from their contractual choices is reminiscent of the “hostile worlds” view identified by
Professor Viviana Zelizer, according to which intimate relations and market relations should
be kept in separate spheres to avoid mutual contamination. See ZELIZER, supra note 8, at 23
(“[A]ccording to the hostile worlds view, intimacy can ... contaminate rational economic
behavior.”). For a recent version of the argument, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, WHAT MONEY
CAN’T BUY: THE MORAL LIMITS OF MARKETS 110-13 (2012).
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to appreciate the extent to which stable status relationships provide
the context for a relational business contract. 
1. Relational Values
As an alternative to imposing an artificial barrier between status
and contract, the “metaphorical and doctrinal analogies between
business and intimate affiliations”169 developed by family law schol-
ars promise to inform our understanding of businesses as well as
families. In particular, an appreciation of the role of status relation-
ships would help to address a deficiency in standard contractual
theory—that the classic, arm’s length exchange of discrete goods or
services bears little resemblance to most real world contracts.
Indeed, “as relationalists have demonstrated since the 1960s, con-
tracts involve thicker relationships than those among strangers.”170
Family businesses, where the relationships among shareholders are
as thick as blood, are a prime example.171
Of course, as long as one includes transaction costs in the model,
the concept of relational contract is, itself, perfectly consistent with
law and economics. The effort to anticipate all possible future states
of the world and to negotiate appropriate contract provisions can
become prohibitively expensive: “A contract is relational to the
extent that the parties are incapable of reducing important terms of
the arrangement to well-defined obligations.”172 In longer term ven-
tures with open-ended goals, contractual incompleteness is unavoid-
169. Ertman, supra note 45, at 79.
170. Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649, 652 (2009); see Ian R.
Macneil, Contracts: Adjustments of Long-Term Economic Relations Under Classical,
Neoclassical, and Relational Contract Law, 72 NW. U. L. REV. 854, 886-900 (1978).
171. See Ertman, supra note 45, at 82. In part, this may be because contractual
relationships are, among family members, suffused with moral as well as legal obligations.
See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family
Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1806 (1985) (“No morality is learned so early and in so
compelling a situation as the morality of family life, and thus no other morality seems as
axiomatic, is felt as passionately, so fixes the behavior we exact of ourselves and expect of
others.”).
172. Charles J. Goetz & Robert E. Scott, Principles of Relational Contracts, 67 VA. L. REV.
1089, 1091 (1981).
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able.173 Thus, as a matter of transaction cost analysis, close
corporations of all stripes can be described as relational contracts.174 
However, reducing relational contracting to a question of trans-
action costs is misleading. First, this approach would limit re-
lational contracts to those in which a complete bargain is cost
prohibitive.175 Yet, businesses involve social relationships, and trust
may sometimes substitute even for otherwise attainable negotia-
tions.176 In particular, social connections among investors are a
central feature of family businesses. Just as prenuptial agreements
are less common in marriages than a rational-actor theory might
suggest given the statistical likelihood of an eventual divorce,177
business contracts among family members may be impeded by simi-
lar considerations.
Second, the law and economics version of relational contracting
assumes that missing terms should be supplied to further the
wealth maximization goals of the business.178 This assumption can
badly mistake the parties’ understood bargain. Family businesses
are market institutions that aim to make a profit, but they can also
provide intrinsic value for family members who find meaning in
173. Id.
174. Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression & Reasonable Expectations: Of Change,
Gifts, and Inheritances in Close Corporation Disputes, 86 MINN. L. REV. 717, 756 (2002) (“[T]he
investment bargains entered into by close corporation shareholders reflect the characteristics
of relational contracts.”). Taken to its logical conclusion, a transaction-cost approach would
account for all supposedly noneconomic aspects of family businesses and show that they, too,
have a price. See ZELIZER, supra note 8, at 29 (“[C]ritics have sometimes countered separate
spheres and hostile worlds accounts with reductionist nothing but arguments: the ostensibly
separate world of intimate social relations, they argue, is nothing-but a special case of some
general principle.”). Professor Zelizer observes that law and economics follows this line of
reasoning: “Take away any cultural camouflage, such nothing-but theorists maintain, and we
will find that intimate transfers—be they of sex, babies, or blood—operate according to
identical principles governing transfers of stock shares or used cars.” Id. at 30.
175. See Moll, supra note 174, at 780 n.203.
176. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness, and the Behavioral
Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1805 (2001) (“The phenomenon of
trust behavior suggests ... that sometimes participants in closely held corporations may
deliberately choose not to draft formal contracts, even when they could do so.”). For instance,
“[s]uppose a potential business partner shows up armed with a lawyer and a ten-page contract
loaded with fine print. What does that behavior suggest?” Id. at 1806.
177. See Allison A. Martson, Note, Planning for Love: The Politics of Prenuptial
Agreements, 49 STAN. L. REV. 887, 889-91 (1997) (noting a divorce rate of 54 percent and
prenuptial agreement rate for first-time newlyweds of 5 percent).
178. Goetz & Scott, supra note 172, at 1091.
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shared effort, mutual support, and the preservation of family
traditions across generations. The norms of family life, as well as
economic considerations, shape the choice of investment and the
structure of internal governance.179 When individual investment
choices reflect a range of market and nonmarket values and moti-
vations, they cannot be appropriately represented by a simple,
utility-maximizing formula. Accordingly, the characterization of
family businesses as nothing more than one investment among
many that a rational investor may choose, depending upon the
expected economic return,180 fails to account for noneconomic,
intrinsic motivations.181 Much of what the parties care about, and
have reason to care about, in a family business is either invisible to
economic analysis or, like dark matter, can only be detected through
its impact on the price mechanisms economists choose to study.
The broader point should be unremarkable: economic analysis
produces many useful insights but has inherent limitations based
on the questions it chooses to ask. As the Nobel laureate Ronald
Coase explains, economic analysis involves “comparisons of the
value of production, as measured by the market.”182 Yet, for broader
policy determinations, he acknowledges that “it is, of course, de-
sirable that the choice between different social arrangements for the
solution of economic problems should be carried out in broader
terms than this and that the total effect of these arrangements in all
179. See MACEY, supra note 72, at 8 (“The term ‘corporate governance’ includes law, policy,
and social norms, as well as contracts that regulate and motivate behavior within the
corporation.”). Jon Elster explains that “[a] sociological alternative to the economic approach
is the theory of social norms.” Jon Elster, When Rationality Fails, in REASONING: STUDIES OF
HUMAN INFERENCE AND ITS FOUNDATIONS 94, 107 (Jonathan E. Adler & Lance J. Rips eds.,
2008). In particular, social norms can be identified “mainly by their non-outcome-oriented
character. Whereas rationality tells people, ‘If you want Y, do X,’ many social norms simply
say, ‘Do X.’” Id.
180. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 232.
181. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 212 (“People care about the meanings embodied in the
social relations in which risks are imposed and controlled, not just about the raw
magnitudes.”). In theory, the pleasures of family life could be characterized in terms of
individual utility, and even family loyalty could be described as an intersubjective utility
function. A broadening of economic analysis to include more realistic accounts of preferences
would seem to be a worthwhile endeavor. 
182. Coase, supra note 47, at 43.
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spheres of life should be taken into account.”183 In other words, we
should not confuse formal analytic rigor with true insight.184 
Even economic analysis that considers the impact of trust on
transaction costs retains the assumption that individuals join
collective associations to advance their own ends.185 On this view,
trust is nothing more than a “subclass of ... risk ... in which the risk
one takes depends on the performance of another actor.”186 Thus,
there is little reason to expect that a more fine-tuned approach to
transaction costs will produce an optimal solution to problems of
shareholder oppression or other conflicts in family businesses. To
understand conflict in family firms, we need to consider the influ-
ence of family life and the role identifications that can motivate
participation in a family business.187 
183. Id.
184. Professor Coase has remarked upon the influence of the “Coase Theorem” in legal
scholarship, which some use to reach policy conclusions without reflecting adequately on the
discrepancy between the model and real-world transaction costs. See R.H. COASE, The
Institutional Structure of Production, in ESSAYS ON ECONOMICS AND ECONOMISTS 3, 11 (1994)
(“I tend to regard the Coase Theorem as a stepping stone on the way to an analysis of an
economy with positive transaction costs.”).
185. Methodological individualism may go unnoticed because it is analogous to the
construction of the individual that forms the basis for the modern liberal state. As
communitarian scholars have observed, however, a vulnerable assumption of liberal theory
is that “[w]e are distinct individuals first, and then we form relationships and engage in co-
operative arrangements with others.” MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF
JUSTICE 133 (2d ed. 1998); CHARLES TAYLOR, SOURCES OF THE SELF: THE MAKING OF THE
MODERN IDENTITY 193 (1989) (tracing modern notion of the disengaged self back to “the new
political atomism which arises in the seventeenth century, most notably with the theories of
social contract of Grotius, Pufendorf, Locke, and others”). Yet, where a
sense of participation in the achievements and endeavors of (certain) others
engages the reflective self-understandings of the participants, we may come to
regard ourselves ... less as individuated subjects with certain things in common,
and more ... as participants in a common identity, be it a family or community
or class or people or nation. 
SANDEL, supra, at 143; see also MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 126 (1983) (arguing
that family obligations are “collectively, not individually, determined; and the determination
reflects our collective understanding of what a family is”).
186. WILLIAMSON, supra note 63, at 257 (quoting JAMES COLEMAN, THE FOUNDATIONS OF
SOCIAL THEORY 91 (1990)). Thus, “trust” is just a form of calculation and not a separate
emotional category. Id. at 257, 263.
187. Note that this analysis does not assume that “family” is itself a stable category,
unaffected by business ventures undertaken by family members. Rather, the point is that
family and business institutions interact. See FINEMAN, supra note 88, at 61 (“Because of the
interactive relationship between the family and other institutions within society, it is much
more accurate to view the family not as existing in or constituting a separate sphere, but
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2. Practical Implications
If courts fail to appreciate the structural importance of family
relationships, those blinders can affect the outcome in a variety of
civil, and even criminal, legal disputes involving family businesses.
Consider, for instance, the majority and dissenting opinions in
United States v. Chestman, in which a stockbroker appealed his
conviction for aiding and abetting the misappropriation of inside
information.188 The central issue on appeal was whether fiduciary
duties of nondisclosure could be extended to a family member in a
family-owned business who was not an active participant and held
no formal position.189 According to the majority, “[k]inship alone
does not create the necessary relationship” and the disclosure did
not serve any business purpose.190 Absent “an express agreement of
confidentiality,” the husband “did not defraud [his wife or her
family] by disclosing news of the pending tender offer to [the stock
broker].”191
In his dissent, Judge Winter argued that the scope of a fiduciary
obligation of nondisclosure should include “family members who
have benefitted from the family’s control of the corporation.”192
Application of a narrower theory of the corporation would ignore the
reality of overlapping relationships:
In the case of family-controlled corporations, family and busi-
ness affairs are necessarily intertwined, and it is inevitable that
from time to time normal familial interactions will lead to the
revelation of confidential corporate matters to various family
members. Indeed, the very nature of familial relationships may
cause the disclosure of corporate matters to avoid misunder-
standing among family members or suggestions that a family
member is unworthy of trust.193
rather, as being a constructed institution contained within the larger society.”).
188. 947 F.2d 551, 555-56 (2d Cir. 1991).
189. See id. at 564. The individual in question “was an extended member of the ... family,
specifically the family patriarch’s ... ‘nephew-in-law.’” Id. at 570.
190. Id. at 570.
191. Id. at 571. As the court explained, “Absent a predicate act of fraud by [the husband],
the alleged misappropriator[’s stockbroker] could not be derivatively liable as [the husband’s]
tippee or as an aider and abettor.” Id. Other securities fraud convictions were affirmed. Id.
192. Id. at 579 (Winter, J., dissenting).
193. Id.
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Although sympathetic to the majority’s concerns about line
drawing, Judge Winter pointed out that the majority’s approach
would mean that “the disclosure of family corporate information can
be avoided only by family members extracting formal, express
promises of confidentiality or by elderly mothers in poor health
refusing to tell their daughters about mysterious travels.”194 Such a
position “seems very unrealistic in that it expects family members
to behave like strangers toward each other.”195 Family members do
not expect to deal with one another at arm’s length, let alone as the
rational actors posited by economic theory.
Thus, even assuming that it would be advisable to keep personal
affairs separate from business dealings,196 legal institutions should
acknowledge the extent to which “[m]oney cohabits regularly with
intimacy.”197 The contractual relationships that constitute family
businesses are rooted in family values and reflect them.
3. Beyond Value Distinctions
Finally, the observation that family businesses harness the
shared commitment of family members to achieve both economic
success and personal fulfillment calls into question the dichotomy
between market and nonmarket values in family and nonfamily
businesses alike:
We expect the market to achieve the efficient production of goods
and services; it is not the arena in which we are supposed to
develop our personalities or satisfy human relational wants....
The expression of the desires to develop personality and to
interact with others is relegated to the family and simulta-
neously glorified and devalued. We see the market as a means
to an end, whereas we see the family as an end in itself....
Dividing life between market and family compartmentalizes
194. Id. at 580. The trip referenced by Judge Winter was to collect stock certificates
necessary to effectuate a merger transaction. The mother told her daughter but instructed her
to keep quiet. Id. at 579.
195. Id. at 580.
196. See ZELIZER, supra note 8, at 22 (“In a normative version, the hostile worlds view
places rigid moral boundaries between market and intimate domains. It condemns any
intersection of money and intimacy as dangerously corrupting.”).
197. Id. at 28.
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human experience in a way that prevents us from realizing the
range of choices actually available to us.198
In this vein, developing a more nuanced understanding of family
business could help us consider a fuller range of options for the
collective pursuit of shared purposes.199 Families are themselves a
locus of economic activity as well as intimacy, and the workplace
can be a source of deep friendship and social networks of mutual
support.200 A reductionist schema in which markets and families are
diametrically opposed is inaccurate and unhelpful.201
As one scholar observes, “most intimacy at work is neither simply
an instrument of workplace success nor irrelevant to that suc-
cess.”202 Thus, from the outset, the filtering of experience through
separate legal and institutional structures implies a category dif-
ference that does not exist:
[T]he economic and intimate spheres are simply not as distinct
as the two models would suggest.... Neither model represents a
truth about social and economic organization. While one
biologizes the organization of a socieoeconomic unit by explain-
ing its internal stratification as a function of the natural sexual
division of labor, the other voluntarizes a socioeconomic unit by
198. Olsen, supra note 4, at 1564. However, to the extent that our more intimate choices
routinely discriminate on the basis of gender and race, see Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate
Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307,
1339-66 (2009), blending the neutral values of the workplace with closer affective ties may
lead to discrimination, whether intentional or unintentional. See Katharine T. Bartlett,
Making Good on Good Intentions: The Critical Role of Motivation in Reducing Implicit
Workplace Discrimination, 95 VA. L. REV. 1893 (2009).
199. See Vicki Schultz, The Sanitized Workplace, 112 YALE L.J. 2061, 2069-70, 2072 (2003).
200. Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117, 118 (2011)
(“The legal assignment of intimacy to the home and production to the workplace masks
various dynamics within the home, the workplace, and spaces in between.”); cf. Katharine
Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1996)
(criticizing the judiciary’s reluctance “to treat housework as work because of the affectionate
familial context in which the work is performed”).
201. See, e.g., Steven L. Winter, Foreword: On Building Houses, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1595, 1614
(1991) (“[O]nce the sophisticated liberal acknowledges that neither the market nor the family
exist in a purely ‘natural’ state—that is, once she affirms that the purpose of the legal system
is to contain and shape both—liberalism and its critique become one and the same.”).
202. Rosenbury, supra note 200, at 131-32.
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explaining its unequal functional differentiation in terms of
consensual agreements.203
Intimacy and markets are neither strictly segregated nor
reducible to a common metric; rather, they are connected, fluid, and
always subject to negotiation: “[E]conomic activities of production,
consumption, distribution, and asset transfers play significant parts
in most [social] relations.”204 We can, therefore, recognize the use-
fulness of maintaining different distributional principles in different
contexts without essentializing the family or the corporation.
Family businesses seek to advance collective goals, economic and
noneconomic; they are contractual, but also reflect status-based
family relationships. 
To be clear, the argument is not that business relationships
should be preordained by kinship, birth order, or gender. Voluntary
contractual relationships create opportunities for individuals that
they might not find within the constraints of traditional family life.
However, family businesses also rely upon and reinforce family ties
that are status based rather than contractual. Individual economic
motivation is only part of the story and should not be viewed in
isolation. Although not as easy to quantify as individual wealth,
broader issues of distribution in a family business implicate the
collective health of the family; further, the continuation of the
family business can provide a mechanism for cross-generational
security. Indeed, a successful family business depends on the efforts
of the family over time, not just current managers. Business values
and family values are connected.
203. Ruskola, supra note 148, at 335; see also Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A
Genealogy, Part I, 23 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 1, 1 (2011) (contending that “family law” emerged
as a separate field of legal study as a consequence of a “categorical distinction from the law
of contract and, more broadly, the law of the market” that was “invented”). Professor Halley
argues that “family law should be restructured to connect it for the first time to domains of
law more readily understood to relate directly to the market.” Id.
204. ZELIZER, supra note 8, at 33. As Professor Zelizer explains, “[i]n the broadest terms,
people create connected lives by differentiating their multiple social ties from each other,
marking boundaries between those different ties ..., sustaining those ties through joint
activities (including economic activities), but constantly negotiating the exact content of
important social ties.” Id. at 32.
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IV. REVISITING FAMILY AND BUSINESS VALUES
Effective planning can reduce the likelihood of conflict in a family
business and provide nondestructive solutions for conflicts that do
arise. However, family businesses often fail to consider issues of
succession and other potential flash points. Nor, in any event, is it
possible to identify in advance all sources of conflict. Consequently,
courts have an important role to play in resolving disputes that
cannot be settled amicably by the parties. This Part contends that
the distinctive features of family businesses should be included at
the planning stage, when litigation is avoidable. Further, consider-
ation of context can help courts adjudicate shareholder disputes
consistent with the parties’ own expectations.
Part IV.A examines legislative solutions to the problem of family
business conflict and concludes that neither existing business entity
forms nor plausible variants can supply default terms sufficient to
dissolve the potential for serious work-family conflict. Part IV.B
contends that although legal advisors to family businesses should
address business concerns in the context of broader family interests
and values, the current model of law practice is not well suited to
provide the kind of multidisciplinary counseling that would benefit
clients most. Part IV.C argues that when courts are called upon to
adjudicate shareholder disputes, they should be open to relevant
evidence concerning family relationships in order to understand the
parties’ true bargain in proper context. 
A. Choice of Entity 
The best way to avoid crippling dissension in a family business,
or any other venture, is to anticipate potential problems and plan
around them. Investors should pick the most suitable jurisdiction
and business entity form to take advantage of default rules that will
structure the parties’ business relationships in at least rough accord
with their intentions.205 However, no available form of business
205. See MACEY, supra note 72, at 23 (“[B]y incorporating their businesses in a jurisdiction
that contains statutory provisions that are to their liking, people organizing new business (or
reorganizing existing businesses) can select or ‘opt into’ the set of ‘off-the-rack’ legal rules that
best fit their needs.... [E]ven within a single jurisdiction, people organizing a business can
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entity can resolve in advance the various potential conflicts that
loom when family interests substantially overlap with business
ownership and management interests.
For many family businesses, the flexibility of the LLC makes it
the best choice among existing options. Before the advent of the
LLC, investors once had to choose either desirable flow-through
taxation rules or limited liability and could not achieve both without
following cumbersome procedures.206 The great advantage of the
LLC is that investors have limited liability and can simply elect
flow-through or entity taxation while also tailoring governance rules
in an operating agreement.207 LLC statutes typically have standard
default options that provide either a partnership or corporation
governance structure; by choosing member management, family
businesses can adopt a form of governance in keeping with their
relative informality.
However, the flexibility of the LLC form does not solve the
problem of shareholder oppression, because abuse of control is an
inherent structural feature of closely held businesses with limited
exit rights and majority rule as the basic gap-filling mechanism.208
Closely held businesses of all stripes tend to use informal gover-
nance structures, but this does not change the raw allocation of real
decision-making power once informal cooperation has come to an
end. Moreover, general default rules cannot hope to cover more than
a fraction of the possible disputes that could occur over the course
select among a variety of different forms of business organization, such as the traditional
corporate form, as well as the limited partnership, the limited liability company, and the
limited liability partnership.”).
206. See Susan Pace Hamill, The Story of LLCs: Combining the Best Features of a Flawed
Business Structure, in BUSINESS TAX STORIES 295, 295-96 (Steven A. Bank & Kirk J. Stark
eds., 2005). For instance, a corporation could choose flow-through taxation by selecting “S”
status only if it met a number of rigid requirements concerning the number of shareholders,
principal place of business, and the like. Id. at 295 & n.2. Alternatively, in more recent years,
a business venture might use the limited partnership form to shield the investors from
liability while preserving flow-through taxation and to establish a corporation to serve as the
general partner and hold the liability. The same individuals would serve as the directors and
officers of the corporation and as the limited partners. Id. at 298, 309-10.
207. For analysis of the LLC and a discussion of its evolution, see id.
208. See Robert B. Thompson, The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression, 48 BUS.
LAW. 699, 699 (1993) (“The statutory norms of centralized control and majority rule, when
combined with the lack of a public market for shares in a close corporation, leave a minority
shareholder vulnerable in a way that is distinct from the risk faced by investors in public
corporations.”).
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of a long-term business relationship.209 Therefore, minority investors
must either depend on specific bargaining210 or judicial intervention
to enforce standards of conduct among shareholders.211
Nor is it clear that a special statute would better suit family
businesses. Here, the history of LLCs may be instructive. Although
many LLC statutes once had provisions that enabled easy, part-
nership-like exit, the default rules were later changed to mirror
corporate law rules that do not guarantee liquidity.212 This was done
to accommodate tax planning in family businesses.213 In order to
qualify for a lack-of-marketability deduction in shares transferred
through inheritance, the holder cannot also have the right to ex-
change them for fair value.214 An automatic exit right provided by
statute, in any case, would have other undesirable features, in-
cluding exposing the business to risk of minority opportunism.215
Also, strong exit rights could be destabilizing and creditors might
worry about the possibility of “a relatively trivial falling out among
the equity investors ... thus raising the cost of capital.”216 
209. See MACEY, supra note 72, at 29 (“[B]y definition, shareholders and other parties to
corporate governance disputes that wind up in litigation have not actually specified a
preferred outcome ex ante.”). Professor Macey observes that, as a consequence, “a court’s
hypothesis that a particular result is the one that the shareholders would have preferred
cannot be refuted.” Id.
210. See infra Part IV.B.
211. See infra Part IV.C.
212. See LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, THE RISE OF THE UNCORPORATION 179-80 (2010).
213. See id. For this reason, some families use limited partnership structures to transfer
wealth between generations: the lack of control and marketability of the limited shares is a
tax-planning advantage. See Kenneth P. Brier & Joseph B. Darby, III, Family Limited
Partnerships: Decanting Family Investment Assets into New Bottles, 49 TAX LAW. 127, 127-28
(1995).
214. See RIBSTEIN, supra note 212, at 179-80. For the same reason, even if the default rule
were otherwise, well-advised family businesses might still modify it in order to preserve the
tax benefit. The lack-of-marketability discount also causes some families to use the otherwise
moribund limited partnership form. See id. at 180.
215. For instance, minority investors could threaten to exercise the exit right at a time
when the business lacked cash and extract a greater percentage of the value of the business
in exchange for not exiting. For further discussion of the problems associated with automatic
exit rights, see Benjamin Means, A Voice-Based Framework for Evaluating Claims of Minority
Shareholder Oppression in the Close Corporation, 97 GEO. L.J. 1207, 1252-53 & n.222 (2009).
216. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 46, at 831; see also MACEY, supra note 72, at 24 (“[B]uy-sell
arrangements are very costly for companies. In particular, creditors understandably view such
arrangements as a significant source of risk, since the exercise of a buy-sell agreement by a
shareholder reduces the ‘equity cushion’ available to creditors whose loans have not been
repaid when the shareholder’s stock is purchased by the company.”).
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In theory, the law could take the opposite approach and provide
stronger default lock-in rules for family businesses. However,
further narrowing the exit option could exacerbate family disputes.
First, family business participants already face a double exit
problem in that ending a business relationship may cause or coin-
cide with damage to family relationships.217 Heightening the fault
requirement for exit would only invite more hostility, making it less
likely that the parties would be able to preserve their kinship ties
while working through the end of the business relationship.218
Second, extensive bargaining among family members can signal
distrust detrimental to the business, and an unmodified, no exit
position would encourage majority opportunism against vulnerable
minority investors.219 
In sum, even though there could be room for a distinct “F”
Corporation entity with default rules designed for family busi-
nesses, proponents of broad changes to the existing default rules
would have to demonstrate that the benefits outweigh the costs. In
the meantime, and as a rough compromise position, the existing
framework of shareholder protections—whether couched in terms
of fiduciary duty or reasonable expectations—limits the grounds for
exit but preserves an important role for courts in resolving end-of-
life issues that the parties have not explicitly negotiated. Though
imperfect, current corporate and LLC forms may offer the best mix
of default governance, tax, and liability rules.
B. Multidisciplinary Practice
Even if default rules are mostly suitable, no standard business
form can substitute for the vital role lawyers play in helping parties
217. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
218. Although a liberal, nonfault approach could jeopardize the favorable tax treatment of
inherited shares and destabilize the business entity, those costs might be compared to the
benefits of easy exit as a kind of insurance policy against future family litigation. Lawyers
sensitive to the needs of family business, see infra Part IV.B, would approach the negotiation
of a buy-sell agreement with these competing considerations in mind.
219. See Mahoney, supra note 70, at 178. Without overstating the analogy, the rarity of
prenuptial agreements, see Martson, supra note 177, at 889-91, may be explained by similar
considerations—in both cases, the absence of such an agreement does not necessarily indicate
an endorsement of the default distributional rules, even if lack of evidence of an alternative
arrangement limits a court’s options.
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identify and negotiate appropriate solutions to a variety of business
planning issues, including external regulatory requirements, fi-
nancing needs, and desired tax treatment.220 Family members may
resist opportunities for planning, whether to preserve trust or sim-
ply to avoid incurring seemingly unnecessary legal fees, but default
rules need tailoring to fit the parties’ particular circumstances:
Within each form of business, the lawyer must help the client
create a working structure that accommodates the participants’
interests and abilities.... It will establish who has what authority
to legally bind the enterprise and lay out how business decision
making will be accomplished. The structure should further
define the financial relationships of the participants and how to
parcel out the fruits of the endeavor. The structure will provide
the means for accepting new participants and allow[ ] an exit
mechanism for those who wish to leave.221
In order to craft provisions that meet a client’s needs, a lawyer
must first appreciate what the client seeks to accomplish: “For
example, an estate planning attorney may be puzzled by a client’s
reluctance to implement the most rational distribution plan, until
she considers the client’s conflict between his desires as a parent (to
treat each offspring equally) and as a business owner (to consolidate
control in one successor).”222 Lawyers advising family businesses
should take special care to explore questions, such as succession and
estate planning, that are critical to the success of the venture.223
Experienced business lawyers learn to work effectively with
family businesses, but methodological training in legal analysis and
issue spotting does not provide lawyers with the tools they need to
appreciate the influence of family dynamics. To supplement their
skill set, lawyers may find that other professionals, such as business
counselors and psychologists, are invaluable in helping families to
avoid conflict. For instance, helping the parties negotiate a buy-sell
agreement requires that a lawyer respect the importance of trust
220. See Hobbs & Hobbs, supra note 23, at 164.
221. Steven H. Hobbs, Toward a Theory of Law and Entrepreneurship, 26 CAP. U. L. REV.
241, 257-58 (1997) (footnotes omitted).
222. GERSICK ET AL., supra note 16, at 5.
223. See Hobbs & Hobbs, supra note 23, at 165-66.
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and take care to avoid the possibility that an arm’s length agree-
ment could undermine broader family dynamics.224
Lawyers who advise family businesses might also collaborate
with or learn from well-established counseling firms: Cambridge
Advisors to Family Enterprise;225 the Family Firm Institute;226 the
Center for Family Enterprises, Kellogg School of Management;227
and the Family Business Network.228 At least one organization, the
International Association of Attorneys for Family-Held Enterprises,
seeks to bring together legal professionals who specialize in repre-
senting family businesses.229 At present, with the possible exception
224. The buy-sell agreement bears some structural similarity to a marital prenuptial
agreement; an absence of barganing in both contexts may be explained by a need to preserve
trust and a perceived inconsistency of trust and contractual protection. See Blair & Stout,
supra note 176, at 1805 (“The phenomenon of trust behavior suggests ... that sometimes
participants in closely held corporations may deliberately choose not to draft formal contracts,
even when they could do so.”).
225. CAMBRIDGE ADVISORS TO FAM. ENTERPRISE, http://www.cambridge-afe.com (last visited
Feb. 9, 2013). According to their website:
Cambridge Advisors to Family Enterprise ... help[s] business families and the
leaders of family enterprises effectively manage the important, and often
complicated and sensitive family, business, ownership, and financial issues they
face. Working closely with our clients, we help build united, industrious families
that create impressive legacies; loyal, capable ownership groups; and high
performance, sustainable enterprises.
Id. Led by senior faculty at the Harvard University Business School, the Cambridge Advisors
to Family Enterprise takes an interdisciplinary approach to problem solving: “Our advisors
form a complementary team, blending disciplines, such as management, psychology,
organizational behavior, law, and finance.” Our People, CAMBRIDGE ADVISORS TO FAM.
ENTERPRISE, http://www.cambridge-afe.com/people.html (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
226. History, FAM. FIRM INST., INC., https://ffi.site-ym.com/?page=History (last visited Feb.
9, 2013) (“For more than 25 years, FFI has globalized its membership, broadened and
deepened its educational and professional programs, and continually enhanced its activities
and services.... [FFI] continues to lead in the area of family enterprise work.”).
227. Center for Family Enterprises, KELLOGG SCH. MGMT., http://www.kellogg.
northwestern.edu/research/family (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (“Established in 1999, the
Center’s focus is on teaching, research and case writing about family business strategy, family
business governance, family business succession, entrepreneurship in the family business,
family foundations, family offices and family business culture.”).
228. Who Are We, FAM. BUS. NETWORK, http://www.fbn-i.org/fbn/web.nsf/doclu/network?
OpenDocument (last visited Feb. 9, 2013) (“The Family Business network is a not-for-profit
international network that is run by family businesses, for family businesses, with the aim
of strengthening success over generations.”).
229. INT’L ASS’N FOR ATT’YS FOR FAM.-HELD ENTERPRISES, http://www.afhe.com (last visited
Feb. 9, 2013). The website lists 100 members and states that “[t]he international association
of Attorneys for Family-Held Enterprises (AFHE) is an independent, non-profit association
of attorneys, practicing in the areas of corporate, litigation, taxation, and trusts and estates
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of trust and estate lawyers, the legal profession does not seem to be
well represented in the mix of counselors who advise family
businesses on a regular basis.230 For instance, a newsmagazine
recently reported that the Ochs-Sulzberger family, which controls
The New York Times, has been “working with a company called
Relative Solutions, which specializes in brokering disputes inside
wealthy families.”231 According to its website, Relative Solutions
employs individuals with degrees in clinical psychology, social work,
and accounting, but no lawyers.232
Although this is not the place for a comprehensive analysis of
possible changes to the structure of the legal profession, two con-
siderations seem particularly relevant to a possible underrepre-
sentation of lawyers in family business counseling. First, legal
representation assumes positional conflict rather than cooper-
ation;233 even in transactional practice, lawyers may help clients
garner a higher percentage of existing value rather than find
creative ways to enhance value for all parties.234 Consequently,
professional ethics rules prohibit conflicts of interest to ensure that
clients receive independent advice.235 The agency cost concerns
who provide multi-disciplinary legal counsel and advice to privately-held enterprises, their
owner-managers, and family members.” Overview, INT’L ASS’N FOR ATT’YS FOR FAM.-HELD
ENTERPRISES, http://www.afhe.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=19&
Itemid=27 (last visited Feb. 9, 2013); see also Member Directory, INT’L ASS’N FOR ATT’YS FOR
FAM.-HELD ENTERPRISES, http://www.afhe.com/index.php?option=com_sobi2 (last visited Feb.
9, 2013). 
230. Further empirical work would be needed to get a clearer picture, but the question
arises whether the relative absence of legal professionals—at least after business formation
and before end-stage issues—reflects low market demand or whether something structural
has limited the ability of lawyers to meet an existing demand.
231. See Joe Hagan, A New York Times Whodunit, N.Y. MAG., June 4, 2012, at 30, 34.
232. See Our People, RELATIVE SOLUTIONS, http://www.relative-solutions.com/people (last
visited Feb. 9, 2013); see also RELATIVE SOLUTIONS, http://www.relative-solutions.com (last
visited Feb. 9, 2013) (“Relative Solutions is a firm that manages change with families as they
look to transition their wealth from generation to generation.”).
233. See Pauline H. Tesler, Collaborative Family Law, 4 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 317, 323
(2004) (describing courts as “function[ing] in an adversarial model”).
234. Obviously, a single negotiation can include value-claiming and value-creating
elements, see Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset
Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239, 264 (1984), but a party that focuses only on creating value could be
in serious jeopardy of coming away with a disadvantageous bargain.
235. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2011); id. R. 1.8.
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behind these prophylactic rules are real,236 but they may also inhibit
creative problem solving. 
Second, the desire to make effective use of psychologists, social
workers, accountants, financial planners, and other professionals
can conflict with the rules of professional responsibility that police
the boundaries of the practice of law and the ability of lawyers to
partner with nonlawyers.237 For lawyers who advise family busi-
nesses, the value of collaborating with professionals from other
disciplines is both obvious and consistent with broader calls for
reform to the structure of the legal profession.238 As a number of
legal commentators have observed, lawyers can no longer afford to
insulate themselves from competition when other professionals can
combine to meet client needs in a less adversarial and more cost-
effective way.239 In the United States, slumping demand for tra-
ditional legal services240 suggests that change may be inevitable.241
236. See Larry E. Ribstein, Ethical Rules, Agency Costs, and Law Firm Structure, 84 VA.
L. REV. 1707, 1709-10 (1998).
237. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 5.4 (2011) (prohibiting fee sharing and
partnerships with nonlawyers); Tanina Rostain, The Emergence of “Law Consultants,” 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1397, 1409 (2006); see also Janet Weinstein, Coming of Age: Recognizing the
Importance of Interdisciplinary Education in Law Practice, 74 WASH. L. REV. 319, 328-51
(1999) (describing professional norms that prevent interdisciplinary work). 
238. See, e.g., Larry E. Ribstein, Practicing Theory: Legal Education for the Twenty-First
Century, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1649, 1664 (2011).
239. See Paul D. Paton, Multidisciplinary Practice Redux: Globalization, Core Values, and
Reviving the MDP Debate in America, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 2193, 2198 (2010) (noting that
“[t]he changed economic reality for law firms in the United States” may prompt
reconsideration of multidisciplinary law practices).
240. See Press Release, NALP, Law School Grads Face Worst Job Market Yet—Less Than
Half Find Jobs in Private Practice (June 7, 2012), available at http://www.nalp.org/
2011selectedfindingsrelease.
241. Some universities have already taken advantage of the need for a more inter-
disciplinary and collaborative approach: “Often family businesses reach for help at university-
based family business centers, where they have access to the expertise of scholars and
practitioners and can learn how to address succession issues in a holistic manner.” Steven H.
Hobbs, Foreword, Entrepreneurship and Law: Accessing the Power of the Creative Impulse, 4
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 1, 17 (2009). In universities, it is possible to “create an
environment which provides a learning opportunity for the students (who may be members
of that family business), a process for various advisors to collaborate in crafting solutions, and
a fertile source of experiential research.” Id. Universities may in some cases garner
substantial revenues from the provision of counseling and general education services to family
businesses. For instance, the Harvard Business School charges $38,000 for a six-day program.
See Executive Education: Families in Business from Generation to Generation, HARV. BUS.
SCH., http://www.exed.hbs.edu/programs/fib/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
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There are a variety of ways that lawyers might approach these
challenges within the confines of existing rules of professional
ethics. For instance, lawyers who regularly advise family businesses
might seek additional training in order to incorporate a broader,
multidisciplinary perspective. Also, family business lawyers could
make a practice of consulting with other professionals, though such
arrangements could run afoul of existing rules concerning fee
sharing.242 However, the client’s willingness to pay a premium for
additional advisors could be an impediment. Indeed, to the extent
that smaller-scale family businesses retain a single outside advisor
on an ongoing basis, the most likely candidate would seem to be the
accountant who assists with books, records, and tax preparation.
If nowhere else, lawyers do get involved when the parties antic-
ipate a lawsuit. In appropriate circumstances, the lawyers could
borrow aspects of the collaborative model developed for dispute
resolution in the context of divorce.243 Lawyers who practice collab-
orative law seek to minimize the adversarial nature of the process
and avoid litigating matters that can be resolved through open
dialogue and reasonable negotiation.244 To incentivize cooperation,
the parties agree that “the lawyers may act as settlement counsel
but not as litigation counsel.”245 A collaborative model, if cleared by
the state courts or bar ethics committees, could be extended to
family business counseling and dispute resolution.246
Even if multidisciplinary advice or creative collaborations are not
realistic for a particular representation, lawyers counseling clients
242. See Steven H. Hobbs, The Ethics and Professional Norms of Family Business Centers,
in THE HOLISTIC MODEL 9, 17 (Greg McCann & Nancy B. Upton eds., 2000).
243. See Elizabeth K. Strickland, Comment, Putting “Counselor” Back in the Lawyer’s Job
Description: Why More States Should Adopt Collaborative Law Statutes, 84 N.C. L. REV. 979
(2006).
244. See Hobbs, supra note 241, at 19 (“The clients and each of their lawyers meet together
and may call in experts such as counselors or financial experts to handle any issues that may
arise during the divorce.”).
245. E. WENDY TRACHTE-HUBER & STEPHEN K. HUBER, MEDIATION AND NEGOTIATION 516
(2d ed. 2007).
246. See id. (“Collaborative law has arisen largely in the family dissolution context, but the
same principles could be applied to many other types of disputes.”). In 2009, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) drafted a Model
Collaborative Law Act, which has been adopted in four states, and eight state bar ethics
committees have approved the use of collaborative law. See Collaborative Law Act Summary,
UNIFORM L. COMMISSION, http://www.uniformlaws.org/ActSummary.aspx?title=Collaborative
%20Law%20Act (last visited Feb. 9, 2013).
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involved in a family business should appreciate that their clients
are unlikely to approach the investment from a rational actor’s
perspective.247 In the first instance, this means that lawyers need to
take special care to safeguard their clients from opportunism that
they may be inclined to overlook. Lawyers should also be proactive
in raising questions about business succession and estate planning
that can cause problems if left unaddressed. However, lawyers
should not view their role as forcing clients to adopt a “rational”
market orientation; clients’ goals, whether market or nonmarket,
are equally entitled to respect. 
C. Adjudicating Plural Values
Although higher levels of trust and loyalty benefit family busi-
nesses, the intersection of family and business values can also spark
conflict. When adjudicating such disputes, often in the context of a
petition for dissolution, courts might seek to apply a single set of
values: either privileging family values or deferring to business
norms. Neither course is desirable because a family business is both
a market institution and an extension of a broader family system.248
Market and nonmarket values cannot be evaluated along a single
dimension.249 A more comprehensive legal approach to governance
problems in family businesses should address both sides of the
equation.
On the one hand, the parties have chosen to participate in a
business venture formed pursuant to statute and modified by any
further contractual understandings. A refusal to apply the law in
favor of an ungrounded, equitable vision of family fairness would
violate the parties’ own expectations and reduce the value of family
247. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
248. See supra Part II.
249. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 70 (“Two goods are incomparable in intrinsic worth if they
are not candidates for the same mode of valuation.”). Isaiah Berlin, an Oxford philosopher and
historian of ideas, offered a defense of value pluralism that remains, in many respects, the
strongest articulation of the theory. In his essay, Two Concepts of Liberty, Berlin argued that
the things we have the most reason to value in life cannot be reduced to one another—liberty
is not the same thing as equality—and that no supervening value can be identified that would
allow us to trade off plural values with any certainty that we are doing so correctly. ISAIAH
BERLIN, Two Concepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY 166, 213 (Henry Hardy ed., 2002). Moreover,
belief in a single organizing principle can be dangerous if it causes us to discount the
complexity of human motivations. Id. at 208.
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businesses as vehicles for profit-seeking activity. But neither will it
do to simply ignore the role that family relationships play in
structuring business activity. This, too, would violate the parties’
own expectations and could damage the systemic trust that market
relations presuppose. Therefore, as with any other relational con-
tract, courts should seek to understand and enforce the parties’
mutual understandings and expectations, and the family context
can sometimes provide helpful interpretive guidance.250
1. Standing
In a family business dispute, the court’s first task may be to
determine whether the plaintiff has an ownership interest that
would give her standing to sue. In some cases, there will be no
formal evidence of ownership or the evidence may be inconsistent.
This is particularly true when the allegation is that the parties were
in a general partnership, a form of business organization that re-
quires no formal registration and exists if the parties agree to co-
own a business for profit.251 Professors Alan Bromberg and Larry
Ribstein describe the evidentiary problem:
[A]spects of the relationship that would otherwise resemble
partnership take on a different coloration in the family setting.
The exercise of control by a spouse may be simply that of a
helpmate in marriage rather than that of a partner; one spouse
may share proceeds of the business in order to satisfy a support
obligation.252
250. It is important to note, however, that the range of appropriate issues for judicial
resolution remains small. Most disputes during the course of a business relationship are
resolved according to the corporate mechanisms of control and cannot be second guessed in
court. See, e.g., Stuparich v. Harbor Furniture Mfg., 100 Cal. Rptr. 2d 313 (Ct. App. 2000).
Only business decisions that have a severe impact on minority shareholders are likely to be
litigated and to present a viable cause of action for common law oppression or statutory
dissolution. See, e.g., Alaska Plastics, Inc. v. Coppock, 621 P.2d 270 (Alaska 1980).
251. See REVISED UNIF. P’SHIP ACT § 101(6) (1997).
252. 1 ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON PARTNERSHIP
§ 2.10, at 2:147 (2012); see also In re Lampe, 331 F.3d 750, 756-57 (10th Cir. 2003) (rejecting
the argument that a business partnership existed when traditional indicia could not be
distinguished from the context of a marriage); McGregor v. Crumley, 775 N.W.2d 91, 99 (S.D.
2009) (same).
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Even in a registered form of business organization, such as a
corporation or LLC, it is possible that the parties will not have
allocated shares or recorded them. Not surprisingly, the parties may
take very different views of the situation once a dispute arises.253 In
adjudicating such disputes, courts should attempt to parse the
meaning of legal documentation, if it exists, in the full context of
family relationships that may guide the interpretation.254
Consider, for example, the contrasting views in Reichman v.
Reichman, in which a New York appellate court overturned the trial
court’s finding that the son lacked an ownership stake in the LLC
and remanded without deciding what percentage interest the son
actually held.255 The father, Paul, exercised effective day-to-day
control over the business, an online retail supplier of bed and bath
products.256 In an injunction action alleging oppression and seeking
an accounting and the imposition of a constructive trust, the son,
Michael, claimed that he had an 80 percent ownership interest.257
The father’s response, which the trial court accepted, was that he
held a majority interest and that the son was merely an employee
of the business.258
253. See, e.g., Ng v. Ng, No. 114291/2010E, at *2-4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 18, 2012) (decision
and order), available at http://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/uploads/file/NgDecision.pdf.
254. For instance, in Berger v. Berger, the court had to decide whether a plaintiff who held
no shares of stock could petition for dissolution based on his beneficial interest in a voting
trust controlled by his father. 592 A.2d 321, 323 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1991). The court
held that, despite the lack of legal ownership, the son had standing to sue. Id. at 325-26
(relying on precedent concerning dissenters’ rights in mergers in which multiple stockholders
leave legal title in the “street name” of a brokerage house); see also Chiu v. Chiu, 832 N.Y.S.2d
89, 91-92 (App. Div. 2007) (holding that “the trial court’s determination that the defendant
Winston Chiu ‘was never a member of the ... LLC’ was against the weight of the documentary
and testimonial evidence” including tax returns that listed Chiu as a 25 percent owner).
255. 930 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263-64 (App. Div. 2011); see also Peter A. Mahler, Father May Not
Know Best: Appeals Court Grants Injunction in Son’s Bid to Establish Majority Ownership of
LLC, N.Y. BUS. DIVORCE (Oct. 17, 2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/
2011/10/articles/llcs/father-may-not-know-best-appeals-court-grants-injunction-in-sons-bid-to-
establish-majority-ownership-of-llc (explaining the appellate court’s decision to overturn the
trial court).
256. The online bedbathstore.com LLC business was the successor to a retail
establishment, Mildred’s For Fine Linens, in Borough Park, Brooklyn. See Reichman v.
Reichman, No. 000158-11, at *4 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2011) (decision and order), available
at http://www.nybusinessdivorce.com/uploads/file/ReichmanTrialCt.pdf.
257. Id. at *1, *4.
258. Id. at *5, *10.
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The trial court noted that when the domain name was registered,
the plaintiff “was still in college,”259 and the court credited the
father’s explanation of the initial business dealings:
Paul Reichman met with counsel to determine the ownership
of the LLC.260 Originally, Paul planned for a total of 100 shares
to be issued, with Michael to own 80 shares. Paul explained
credibly that, in sum and substance, he wanted Michael to feel
like he had some ownership in a company, particularly given
that Michael had had some difficulties during college. Paul
wanted to have some ownership, nevertheless, because he put
his life savings into the LLC.
Almost immediately after forming the initial plan, Paul
thought better of it given his extensive financial contribution,
and determined that Michael should receive 15 shares, and Paul
should receive the other 85. Paul also admitted that part of his
motivation in granting shares to Michael was to shield assets
from Paul’s wife, as Paul and his wife had marital difficulties at
that time.261
The documentation concerning the parties’ respective ownership
interests indicated that there were further alterations over time.262
The parties signed an LLC operating agreement that stipulated that
Paul would have sixty shares and Michael would have the remain-
ing forty shares.263 Finally, when the business applied for a loan
from the Small Business Administration, it learned that the loan
would be denied if Michael, who was arrested in college, held an
ownership stake in the LLC.264 The trial court accepted Paul’s
testimony that Michael had agreed to transfer his ownership stake
to Paul, stating, “[w]hatever it takes, Dad.”265
259. Id. at *4.
260. That the initial allocation of ownership interests was devised with the assistance of
counsel should give the reader pause and, albeit anecdotal, suggests that lawyers will not
always find drafting solutions to potential governance problems in closely held family
businesses, even if they are consulted in advance.
261. Reichman, at *4-5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 11, 2011).
262. See id. at *5.
263. Id.
264. Id.
265. Id. (“The Court credits this testimony, as it is consistent with Michael’s age, relative
inexperience in the industry compared to Paul, and Paul’s capital contribution to the LLC
which dwarfs any contribution by Michael.”).
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The trial court observed that the documentation of ownership was
“far from atypical in a small, family-run business” and concluded
that “the actions of the parties ... are most telling as to their intent
regarding ownership of the LLC.”266 Reviewing the evidence, the
court found that Paul had “acted in a manner consistent” with
ownership whereas Michael acted like an employee.267 Moreover,
Michael never received tax documents indicating an ownership
interest, he received tax-free health care, typical for an employee,
and he had no familiarity with many of the important aspects of
business ownership.268 In sum, the trial court viewed the evidence
through the perspective of the family relationship, giving significant
weight to the son’s relative youth and inexperience, and citing
background context to discount the import of documentation that
seemed to indicate the son held a controlling stake.269
In a summary order reversing the trial court and awarding
temporary injunctive relief to prevent dissipation of assets, the
appellate court held that the son established a likelihood of success
on the merits “by submitting evidence tending to show that he is a
member of the LLC, including a copy of the LLC operating agree-
ment, which states that he owns a 40% share of the LLC.”270 One
commentator summarized the trial court’s job going forward:
While the appellate court clearly views Michael as having
some ownership interest, it left open what percentage he owns
and gives little or no clue how the lower court is supposed to
weigh and resolve the conflicting documentary evidence and
testimony in reaching a determination whether Michael owns
15%, 40% or 80%.271
Although the appellate court did not fully explain its reasoning,
it rejected the trial court’s use of family context to trump properly
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. Id. at *5-6. Although the ruling was not a final disposition on the merits, the court
held that any damages Michael might establish, either as an employee or possibly as a
“limited shareholder,” could be addressed through money damages. Id. at *6. The court also
took note of the fact that the business provided employment for approximately twenty people
and that a transfer of control could jeopardize the financial health of the company. Id.
269. See id. at *5-6.
270. Reichman v. Reichman, 930 N.Y.S.2d 262, 263-64 (App. Div. 2011).
271. Mahler, supra note 255.
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executed business documents.272 It is not clear from the appellate
court’s opinion whether analysis of the family relationships would
be relevant to determining the status and proper interpretation of
the relevant legal documents. According to this Article’s recom-
mended approach, family context does not give a court license to
ignore the entity form selected or any other formalities followed by
the parties; but evidence that family relationships have created
mutually understood expectations among the parties should guide
the interpretation of formal legal materials concerning the business.
2. Reasonable Expectations
Assuming that the plaintiff has standing to pursue an action, the
court should next determine if family interests are actually “at
stake.”273 In a spillover dispute, for instance, the business justifica-
tion for challenged conduct would merely disguise what is in reality
a family grievance, rather than an independent decision concerning
the best deployment of economic resources.274 When the source of
conflict seems unrelated to the business operations, the courts
should scrutinize the challenged transactions closely for the possi-
bility of abuse of control.
For example, in Meiselman v. Meiselman, the complaining share-
holder sought dissolution and alleged that he had been excluded
from the business by his brother, who was the controlling share-
holder.275 The court concluded that the controlling shareholder’s
defense—that his brother suffered from mental illness—was not
well supported and reflected family tensions stemming from “an
argument [plaintiff] had with his father which took place about 20
years ago during which Mr. Meiselman castigated [plaintiff] for
272. See Reichman, 930 N.Y.S.2d at 263-64.
273. For instance, as Professor Anderson observes, freedom of movement may be a basic
right but it “is not really at stake in a town’s decision to enforce traffic laws for safety; that
is, enforcing this tradeoff between effective freedom of movement and safety does not throw
into question one’s commitment to valuing persons as free.” ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 71
(noting by comparison that “[p]rohibiting all overseas travel in the name of citizens’ safety”
would likely violate the higher value of respecting individual liberty).
274. See supra Part II.C.1.
275. 307 S.E.2d 551, 555 (N.C. 1983). The relevant statute authorized courts “to order
dissolution or another more appropriate remedy when ‘reasonably necessary’ for the
protection of the ‘rights or interests’ of the complaining shareholder.” Id. at 553 (citing N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 55-125(a)(4) (currently located at § 55-14-30(2)(ii) (2012))).
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having a non-Jewish woman at a family function.”276 Nor was the
court persuaded by testimony concerning “another fight which
occurred between [the brothers] after [the controlling shareholder]
had failed to invite [plaintiff] to a football game to which all of the
males in the family traditionally had been invited.”277 Although
family relationships may properly inform a court’s understanding
of the business arrangements that have been agreed upon, family
grievances do not create a business justification for oppressive
conduct against a minority shareholder.278
On the other hand, family ties do not trump business norms; the
mere fact that a family member’s interest conflicts with a business
norm does not call into question an ordinary business decision,
whether from a practical, moral, or legal standpoint:
In private life, one may of course give the interests of the
beloved priority over those of strangers. But in public life, as in
assigning jobs, one may not weight the interests of the beloved
more heavily than the interests of a random applicant. Nepotism
is prohibited by the demands of respect, and it is not required by
the forms of love compatible with life in modern liberal societies.
No single weighted preference ranking can explain a person’s
choices across all of her social roles.279
For a family value to be implicated by a business decision, it
must be part of the parties’ understood business relationship.280
Somewhat akin to the statutory framework that authorizes the
establishment of the business entity and sets its default rules, a
family’s value system also provides background principles against
which the parties can order their affairs. A broad contractual
approach to interpreting and enforcing the parties’ bargain ad-
vances the parties’ purposes as to matters that—for reasons of
transaction costs, social costs, or sheer inadvertence—they have left
276. Id. at 556.
277. Id.
278. See id. at 559-60.
279. ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 72. Although the antinepotism norm would not apply, at
least as rigorously, in a family business setup, in part because it provides an employment
vehicle for family members, neither would higher family obligations trump neutral
consideration of merit.
280. See Meiselman, 307 S.E.2d at 563.
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unspecified.281 This approach is consistent with the reasonable
expectations analysis for resolving shareholder oppression claims
adopted in an increasing number of states.282
Some may object that judicial analysis cannot go beyond the for-
malized business arrangements without losing its objective char-
acter and becoming a vehicle for a court to impose its own values on
the parties. Although this objection identifies a real concern, it is
one that applies with equal force to the traditional economic
approach to gap filling. When the parties have not bargained over
a term, contract is always a “metaphor.”283 Courts seek to fill the gap
with the term that, hypothetically, the parties would have chosen.284
In traditional economic analysis, efficiency serves as a guiding prin-
ciple, both predictive and normative, clarifying the role of the
courts.285 Thus, courts assume that the parties would have selected
the rule best designed to maximize the economic value of their
investment.286 
Yet, the efficiency hypothesis may ignore the parties’ actual in-
tentions when entering the business relationship and supply a term
that they would not likely have chosen for themselves. The gap
between reality and the hypothetical, economically rational actor
looms particularly large in a family business. If courts consult only
economic values in completing the parties’ contract, they will ignore
an important dimension of the actual business arrangement, setting
281. See supra Part III.B. For instance, if family relationships suggest disparate bargaining
power and the existence of strong nonmarket norms, courts would pay closer attention to
modifications of the default rules that undermine family values. This approach would be
analogous to that recommended by the American Law Institute for review of private bargains
concerning marital dissolution: “In certain contexts, law may legitimately regulate and at
times even strictly scrutinize such opt-outs in order to guarantee procedural and substantive
fairness.” Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism and Perfectionism in Private Law 22 (June 20, 2011)
(unpublished manuscript) (citing AM. LAW INST., PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY
DISSOLUTION 945-1032 (2000)), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1868198.
282. See John H. Matheson & R. Kevin Maler, A Simple Statutory Solution to Minority
Oppression in the Closely Held Business, 91 MINN. L. REV. 657, 679 (2007).
283. See MACEY, supra note 72, at 28.
284. See id. (“In other words, the provision of non-contractual corporate law rules is a
creative exercise that only uses the contractual paradigm as a metaphor.”).
285. See Ribstein, supra note 65, at 366.
286. See EASTERBROOK & FISCHEL, supra note 39, at 34 (contending that courts should
assume that the parties are rational, economic actors and choose the term that the parties
“would have bargained for had they anticipated the problems and been able to transact
costlessly in advance”).
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aside the parties’ own understanding of their bargain. Admittedly,
when family values and business values point in different direc-
tions, it may be hard to ascertain which rule the parties would have
chosen. However, this is a feature of long-term, relational contracts
in general, and the lack of a perfect interpretive approach should
not counsel in favor of retreating to a reductionist account of the
parties’ bargain. Without an appreciation of context, a court cannot
hope to identify the parties’ true bargain. To ignore enmeshed fam-
ily values is to disregard the nature of a family business.
Finally, if the contract metaphor cannot always be sustained
given competing values at stake in a family business, family rela-
tionships might also give content to the concept of fiduciary duty
that underlies the law of shareholder oppression in many jurisdic-
tions.287 Because there is something to fiduciary obligation that
cannot be fully captured by contractual analysis, fiduciary duties
could be a way of valuing family expectations that fall outside of
even a broad understanding of the parties’ bargain.288 For instance,
the parties litigating may be descendants of the individuals who
established the business. Although, as a matter of strict contract
doctrine this is not a relevant point—the current owners must live
with the original bargain, or change it if they can—the disconnect
between what the founders may have intended and the interests
and understandings of the current participants can be immense.289
287. See, e.g., Douglas K. Moll, Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The
Unanswered Question of Perspective, 53 VAND. L. REV. 749, 760-61 (2000).
288. See, e.g., Sandra K. Miller, The Role of the Court in Balancing Contractual Freedom
with the Need for Mandatory Constraints on Opportunistic and Abusive Conduct in the LLC,
152 U. PA. L. REV. 1609, 1634-45 (2004) (arguing that fiduciary duties offer more protection
than contractual obligations of good faith and fair dealing). For a more comprehensive
account, see D. Gordon Smith, The Critical Resource Theory of Fiduciary Duty, 55 VAND. L.
REV. 1399, 1482 (2002) (arguing that “the purpose of fiduciary duty is to combat opportunism
in such relationships”).
289. However, the desirability of fiduciary analysis as a supplement to a more contractual
approach must be balanced against the increased costs of transactional uncertainty. As I
noted in previous work, “[p]erhaps fiduciary duty in Justice Cardozo’s grand style is too lofty
and we should fix our gaze on something closer to home and more attainable, like an
understanding of the parties’ bargain rooted in relational contract theory.” Benjamin Means,
The Vacuity of Wilkes, 33 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 433, 470 (2011). On the other hand, and as I
further observed, “perhaps a non-reductive approach to minority-shareholder oppression will
necessarily include a number of values that are in tension with one another, that cannot be
arranged into a final framework, and that can only be adjusted case by case.” Id.
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CONCLUSION
Despite their economic importance, the distinctive character of
family businesses has been overlooked. Instead, legal analysis turns
on the form of business organization—partnership, corporation, or
LLC—and generally assumes that the participants are rational
actors who seek to maximize their individual preferences.290 Yet,
just as family law scholars have argued that contracts can regulate
intimate relationships, corporate law scholars should recognize that
the intimacy of family life often substitutes for arm’s length bar-
gaining in family businesses. 
Describing family business as an extension of family relationships
offers two principal advantages. First, a fuller understanding of the
sources and consequences of conflict in family business is necessary
for the development of appropriate judicial, legislative, or counseling
solutions. The rational-actor model of autonomous individual choice
structures much contemporary corporate law scholarship, but leaves
out relationships premised on trust, valued for their own sake, and
aimed at communal rather than individual benefit. In a family
business, mutual expectations may be based in substantial part on
intimacy and trust.
Second, by integrating economic and social factors, we can revisit
the artificial dichotomy between economic and noneconomic insti-
tutions, perceiving status, trust, bargaining, and background legal
rules as alternative and potentially complementary mechanisms
that can organize groups to accomplish shared purposes.291 In this
regard, corporate law scholars can learn from the work of family law
scholars who have already drawn upon contract theory to advocate
an expansion of the boundaries of private ordering in domestic
relationships. This exchange should be a two-way street: the con-
tracts that structure business relationships may build upon and
presuppose the existence of shared family values.292
290. See supra notes 34-41 and accompanying text.
291. See MACEY, supra note 72, at 8-9 (contending that corporate governance depends upon
“[a] large and diverse array of mechanisms and institutions” including “contract, law, and
societal norms and customs”).
292. Ertman, supra note 45, at 82.
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This Article focuses on the management of conflicting social roles,
but the study of family business also invites a bolder question:
whether it makes sense to stand family life in opposition to the
workplace and to accept the dichotomy between economic and
noneconomic values.293 If social roles were more broadly defined and
inclusive, our relationships at home and at work might be richer
and more varied. The normative goal for some businesses is driven
by market efficiency, but this is neither always the case nor always
appropriate. Family businesses can combine entrepreneurial vision
with mutual concern and respect among members of the family,
strengthening the nation’s economy and its social fabric.
293. Olsen, supra note 4, at 1564 (“Dividing life between market and family
compartmentalizes human experience in a way that prevents us from realizing the range of
choices actually available to us.”).
